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ABSTRACT
Rapid growth of physical development in Indonesia has proven to be hazardous to the
environment. Realizing that proper control of it required effective development policies,
the Government of Indonesia (GOI) decided to regulate environmental planning. Many
expected that the regulations would ensure proper planning and implementation in order
to diminish negative impacts of the development in the environment.
The GOI used spatial plan and environmental impact assessment as regulatory instruments.
They were linked to one another in a set of formal procedure that all development
proposals must go through. The use of these tools was meant to provide guidance for
proper land allocation and technical specification. However, it turned out that the GOI
has not implemented these laws consistently and effectively. Many government officials
claimed that the regulation was useless. Over time, more and more developments ignored
the procedure, resulting in a rise in the number of projects that did not have legal
acceptance. Consequently, this situation is risking the waste of money and human
resource investments, since the government has set up an extensive institutional backup to
support the implementation.
The initial hypothesis of this study is that weak implementation of a policy suffers from a
weak management from the institution. Furthermore, the way the institution is being set-
up greatly influenced such situation. Of course that there are other reasons contribute to
the problem, such as the low quality of the policy content. However, based on initial
findings that policy content has already been changed a number of times in the past decade
without visible improvements, the focus of this study will be the institutional problem.
The result of this study will consist of suggestions to restructure the legal procedure and
reorganize the institutional set-up. These suggestions will be based on the need to
conduct a more efficient and effective procedure, along with consistent and committed
implementation, with the recognition of cultural and political issues that the country still
has to resolve.
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INTRODUCTION
Backround and Statement of the Problem
1.1 Introduction
For the last 25 years, Indonesia has achieved high growth rates of economic
development, ranging from 4% to 8% per year. The country has successfully reduced
poverty and increased its per capita income through developments in agriculture, mining,
and manufacturing sectors, as well as sound macroeconomic policies.
However, the country pays a high price for these achievements. The fact that
industrialisation is the most prominent engine in creating jobs and revenues has created a
climate to prioritise industrial sectors, including urban services, in development decisions.
As a consequence, industrial centres boomed throughout the country, supported by
extensive exploitation of natural resources to fill their manufacturing capacities, rapid
urbanisation and urban growth emerged, and, topping all of that, sharp deterioration in
land, water, and air quality due to pollution and extensive degradation of natural resources
occurred.
The source of the problems can be traced back to the origin of the nation's
macropolicy. During the first 25 year plan of modern Indonesia (1969 - 1994)', the goal
of development emphasized economic development; therefore all efforts to increase
national productivity in all sectors, particularly in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing
become the main program in the government's agenda. Based on this, the Government of
' Industrialisation and economic growth which marked the modernisation in Indonesia started in 1966, with Suharto
as the president. Before the period, there was a long history of severe economic crisis as well as rocketing inflation
rate. President Suharto started the first national 25 year plan in 1969 (also known as Long Term Development Plan
or PJP), regarded as the first comprehensive and systematic macropolicy.
Indonesia (GOI) justified the utilisation of land and natural resources fully under their
authorisation. Soon after independence, the vastly undeveloped land, mainly forests, was
claimed to be a national property as the GOI had the sole right in determining its
development. In order to achieve faster investments in industrialisation and higher
economic of returns, natural resources were highly 'mobilised' and exploited. The high
rates of exploitation were also stimulated by the fact that the country experienced high
inflation over time and needed to raise revenues to support physical developments, such as
basic infrastructure.
In the meantime, population growth is pressuring newly urban centres and forces
people to move to the economic centres. Unfortunately, due to the geographical features
of Indonesia only one island, Java, becomes the main concentration area of economic
centres. As a result, Java, which is only 7% of the total land becomes the home of 60% of
the population, over 100 million people. This had made Java one of the most densely
populated islands in the world. As a result, agriculture and rural activities are declining.
Java is seen as having no other choice to answer the pressures of both population and
economic activity growth than to convert almost all land into highly economic uses, such
as urban and industrial areas. Such conditions have made lands outside Java, which were
relatively underdeveloped, undervalued.
In order to achieve social equity, accommodate population growth, compensate
the disappearing agriculture land in Java, and supply labour for natural resource
exploitation industries outside Java, the GOI had been allocating the people all over the
country and distributing the land. This has forced the government to open forests for
agriculture and rural settlements. During the last 25 years, millions of people were
relocated and millions of hectares of forests were converted to agriculture areas. The
undervaluation of land and the pressure to serve Java's basic needs instead of local needs
has driven an inefficient use of these areas.
By the end of the 25-year plan's period, severe erosions in formerly forested areas
had brought a dimunition on water and air quality, rapid extinction of several animal and
plant species, and heightened the vulnerability of the ecosystem, characterized by pest
outbreaks, local floods, difficulties in extinguishing fires and changes in microclimate.
Furthermore, exploitation of natural resources, mainly mining activities, also created local
pollution and land destruction. On the other hand, urban centres in Java have also
experienced rapid environmental deterioration as well. Industrial centres pollute the
environment, lack of proper infrastructure reduces the quality of life in cities, and rapid
urban population growth keeps on demanding more water and land and produces more
wastes. Complex issues, such as conflicting interests, limited human and financial
resources, and unresponsive political system worsened the condition because proper
improvement actions by the government cannot be effectively achieved.
The GOL, realizing that most of the inefficiency in land uses and rapid deterioration
resulted from a lack of proper spatial planning, issued the Act of Spatial Planning No. 24
in 1992. In addition, the fact that environmental concerns had become an important
international issue, forcing many nations to commit to policies on such matters,
encouraged the GOI to emphasise sustainable development in the second 25 year plan's,
supported by effective spatial planning.
About a decade before, realising the rapid deterioration of environmental quality in
the country, GOI issued the Act of Environmental Law No. 4 in 1982. This act was
followed by the establishment of Environmental Impact Management Agency in 1990, an
effort to increase the political role and executive function of the Ministry of Environment.
Later on in 1997, an improvement of Act No. 4 was issued (Act No. 23). The two Acts
above become the embryo of modern environmental planning in Indonesia.
To cover the policy weaknesses in technical terms and specifications during
planning stage, many tools were issued. The most notable was Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) known in Indonesia as Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan
(AMDAL). EIA first appeared in 1986 because of pressures from politically important
stakeholders that recognised the lack of proper environmental judgement in planning. This
concept became very popular and purposely serves as the "first gate" of environmental
friendly development concept and planning. Over time, more people and stakeholders
agreed to its importance in the planning process, and the GOI decided to make its use a
requirement for getting or renewing development licenses. Spatial plans and EIAs became
the heart of environmental planning in Indonesia, and they were meant to complement
each other by providing basic guidance of land use and environmentally-friendly technical
requirements for activities.
However, recently, people and government officials have started to complain
about their effectiveness in answering environmental issues. Both tools, which were
meant to be sources of information for decision making in approving a development
action, can not optimally fulfill the goal. Decision makers complain about the quality of
the information, and are even beginning to question the function of the Acts. Part of this
complaint comes from the fact that there were no co-ordinated and integrated effort to
directly linked both tools implementation. Their sequential existence in the process of
development was often blurred, emerging in examples like permitting before EIA
approvals, or unrelated projects within the existing spatial plan. More officials and
developers regard both tools as "nuisances" which cost a lot of money and time with little
effect. So far there are no mechanisms that can ensure both tools to be consistently
followed during practice.
Considering that both concepts are the main tools to ensure proper environmental
vision in planning and development, a lack of commitment to use them has saddened many
people. It is important to understand why such a condition emerged. Is it because the
institutional set up of both tools is inadequate ? Is it because their concept and technical
guidance is unclear ? Or is it because they do not have proper political support ? All of
these questions are related to each other; however, it is very difficult to try answering all
of them.
A policy's effectiveness is highly dependent on the institutional structure within
which it resides. This reasoning is the starting point of this study, which is trying to figure
out a proper institutional set up for achieving effective environmental planning in
Indonesia.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The problem of environmental planning in Indonesia was centered in its
implementation. The regulation was not consistently followed, resulting in a too
bureaucratic process to support effective results.
Consequently, improvements will demand a simpler and clear process. Hopefully,
a simpler and straightforward process can ensure consistency, as it was caused by
confusions and unnecessary intervention from various sources. However, to achieve that,
the whole institutional set-up need to be restructurized first.
The reasonings of this problem definition will be discussed in chapter 2.
1.3 Objective of the Study
Initial findings conclude that the sources of dissatisfaction of environmental
planning in Indonesia come from :
a) Inadequate information for decision making, due to uncoordinated processes between
spatial plans and EIAs:
e Spatial plans served as general guidance, which for many decision makers often
suffer from its unreliable information about natural resources.
* EIAs serve as technical guidance document that tend to be very project specific
and therefore limited in scope.
b) Both spatial plans and EIAs are not well implemented, due to a lack of commitment
and compliance. The problem appears during processing, where each tool is being
developed according to dominant interests, not according to the legal procedure. Such
a framework belittles the credibility of the result.
The objectives of this study are :
1) Understanding what causes the current system to fail in supporting decision makers,
focussing on the institutional set-up. This will be accomplished by using case studies
for comparison between the formal planning procedure and the real practice of
implementation.
2) Formulating suggestions to solve the problems.
2.Overview of Indonesian Legislative for Environmental
Planning
The concept of environmental planning is not exactly recognised as an exclusive
subject in Indonesia. Instead it is embodied in several other planning tools and regarded as
a part of a certain policy, such as regional planning, urban planning, or even a broad
economic planning policy. This is quite understandable, given that the definition of
'environmental' covers almost all kinds of media, resources, and sectors. Because the
governance system in the country is divided into sectors and each implements the task of
environmental planning and protection in its own style, the concept seems to suffer from a
lack of consistent application despite the fact that such policy for each sector is actually
aimed to fulfil a similar target.
However, most policy makers informally agree that the basic concept of
environmental planning in Indonesia is formed in spatial plan and environmental impact
assessment. These two concepts can wholly and comprehensively cover the main focus of
environmental planning, which includes planning for environmental protection, efficient
use and conservation of natural resource, impacts and pollution minimisation, as well as
long term environmental quality improvement. Both concepts are legally binding,
supported and implemented by almost all level and sectors of governmental agencies, and
used as a formal guidance and basis for further development and environmental protection
efforts by all stakeholders.
The basic regulations of both concepts are : Act No. 24/1992 and Act No. 23/1997
(formerly Act. No. 4/1982). Act No. 24/1992 is important because it is used as a basis for
the spatial planning operational efforts, and Act No. 23/1997 is used as guidance for
conducting EIA and 'post planning' pollution control policy. Both Acts are supported by
various operational regulations, such as Presidential and related Ministers Decrees.
Figure 2.1
Basic Regulation of Environmental Planning in Indonesia
Act
No. 24/1992
(Regulation for Spatial Planning)
Government
Regulations
(Not developed yet)
Act
No. 23/1997
(Regulation for Environmental Management)
Government
Regulations No. 51/1993
(Basic Operational Regulation
for EIA Implementation)
Minister of Environmental Sectors Ministries
Decrees for -- Decrees for
EIA General Technical Guidance Specific EIA
Technical Guidance
Explanation:
1) Act No. 24/1992
Serves as the basic law of spatial planning. It provides explanation on the hierarchy of
spatial planning, the institutional set up of spatial planning, and sanctions and fees for
violating the law. This act is supposed to be explained by at least 14 government
regulations, but these have not been issued yet.
2) Act No. 23/1997
Serves as the basic law of environmental management. It provides the hierarchy of
environmental management, including planning, institutional set up, and sanctions for
violating the law. The act is a renewed concept of Act No. 4/1982, which is used as
the base for the related government regulations.
3) Government Regulation No. 51/1993
The regulation that specifically explained everything about EIA, including the
procedures and institutional set up. After the introduction of Act No. 23/1997, this
regulation was considered to be unfit, and initiatives to renew it is being conducted.
4) Minister of Environmental Decrees
A set of MoE decrees served as guidance for EIA methodology and the operational of
EIA commission.
A very important point that I should mention here is that the term 'planning' often
confuses people and policy makers in focusing on which are the most important aspect of
environmental planning policy. Several agencies strongly believe that independent
concepts like ecolabelling, green consumerism, or green technology are as important as
spatial planning and EIA in environmental planning because most efforts are conducted in
planning stages. Others argue that sector-based policy such as forestry should be regarded
as a separate entity in environmental planning, and many consider that media-based actions
such as river/waterbodies protection and pollution control are also important aspects of
environmental planning. The reasons why such concepts are narrowed down as parts of
spatial planning and EIA are because sector-based and media-based policies would be
regarded as a part of spatial plan according to Act No. 24/1992, and pollution control is
regarded as a 'post-planning' policy. Concepts like green technology, green consumerism,
or ecolabelling are not formally regulated because they are not aimed to be a government-
initiated effort. Furthermore, their implementation in Indonesia is still in the 'introduction'
stages and applied only to a few exclusive and important projects, such as the energy
sector and major industries with hazardous pollutants. Such concepts might be worth
mentioning later when their implementation becomes a part of formal policies.
3. Introduction to the Cases
3.1 Case Selection
The cases in this study should be able to represent past practice of planning and
development in Indonesia. Therefore, they were selected based on these factors:
A) Scale and Type of the Project
Most of the problematic projects were large scale and multisector ones. The term
'problematic' here was a description of a situation which most of the stakeholders were
dissatisfied with the project's outcomes due to controversial handling and decision
making.
'Large' scale in this context are mainly based on nominal scaling requirement for
EIA study, regulated by related agencies, which determined the minimum standard of
project's size which was considered large enough to produce complex and multiple
impacts.
"Multisector' means that more than one government agency has direct
responsibility and required to conduct final decisions, from planning to execution phase
(execution phase includes post construction activities, such as monitoring and compliance,
as well).
B) Spatial Pattern
Based on initial description of spatial problems in unsustainable development
practice, the cases will be chosen to represent : a) urban development; in which the
projects' setting were urban environment, and b) non-urban development; where the
projects dealt with competition between the protection and the exploitation aspect of land
use. These two categories also represent the geographical pattern of environmental
problems in Indonesia (e.g. urban problems in Java, and natural resource problems in non-
Java), therefore the chosen cases were regarded adequate to represent the localities of the
problem throughout the country.
C) Sector Development
The chosen project also reflect important sectoral development in the country,
which are : a) urban/city development; located in coastal and water protection area via
multiple infrastructure services simultaneously built in one area, b) agriculture
development; not only representing basic agriculture activities development but also rural
development and population resettlement (transmigration) policy, c) forestry development;
which represents the integrated efforts to exploit and utilize a renewable natural resource,
and d) mining development; which represents integrated effort to exploit and utilize non-
renewable natural resource.
D) Institutional Responsibility
Many of the development projects in Indonesia are either fully initiated and
managed by the central government or local government. The cases should be able to
represent the uniqueness of being implemented by each particular government agency.
The cases which adequately met the factors described above will hopefully be able
to answer these specific questions:
1. The failure of the system in each of these cases:
" What is the real cause of inconsistencies between the regulation and actual
practice?
" Is there a specific reason due to different settings of each cases ? If yes, why is
it different and does it matter ?
2. Why does this failure/inadequacy exist ?
" Is it because of a confusing procedural set up?
" Is it because of an unsupportive institutional set up?
e Is it because of the unfriendly cultural and political environment to the
established system?
It is important to know that all of these questions are being focused to answer institutional
problems. It is true that maybe some of the problems in ineffectiveness of environmental
planning comes from other situation, such as low quality of guidance or low public
participation, etc. But to ensure that this study is well focussed, the priority of analysis
will be given to institutional study. Other issues will be attached and mentioned if
necessary but will not be discussed in depth.
3.2 Overview of the Cases
Based on the criteria above, the cases that will be used in this study are Kapuknaga
waterfront city development, and Freeport Corporation gold mines. Beside the fact that
these cases met the needed criteria (see fig. 3.1), they are chosen because of the
controversy they have created and the availability of data and information.
Figure 3.1
Selected Cases and the Needed Criteria
I Kapuknaga Waterfront City Freeport Gold & Copper Mines
Scale & Type Large and complex Large and complex
Spatial Pattern Located in Java Located outside Java
Located in productive area Located in "underdeveloped" area
(urban centers & agriculture area) (unused forest area)
Sector Development Urban Sector Non-urban/Mining Sector
Institutional Local Government as initiator and Sector agency (Dept. of Mines and
Responsibility coordinator Energy) as initiator and coordinator
3.2.1 Case 1: Kapuknaga Waterfront City
The Kapuknaga project was initiated by a certain investor who cleverly noticed the
current outflow of Jakarta's middle class people to new suburban areas. A significant
decrease in the capital city's environmental quality forced them to seek new residential
areas in small cities in three districts area around Jakarta, widely known as BOTABEK2.
Ironically, this new movement in Indonesia creates a bigger dependency on Jakarta
because suburban areas in BOTABEK fail to provide enough amenities and job
Criteria
opportunities for the middle class. The growing economic activities in these areas only
attract blue collar workers, such as factory labours, while social and service facilities can
only provide job opportunities to a small portion of the whole new middle class residence.
Consequently, new economic activities keep on emerging in the capital city, drawing more
new middle class people that have no other choice but to live in suburban areas, and
creating a rapid growth in commuter traffic from the city centre to the surrounding city.
Instead of becoming a "deconcentrated" city, Jakarta has grown much bigger, creating a
mega metropolitan area characterized by heavy air pollution. This, in turn, makes living in
suburban area is less attractive.
This trend was seen by investors as promoting a new demand to live as close as
possible to Jakarta. High rise apartments were built in the downtown area, and the city's
officials started to get the idea of utilising the city's coastal area.
In 1995, two new mega projects emerged. Both were initiated by the need to
provide a very close residential areas to Jakarta, but were guided by a desire to avoid the
hassle of renewing existing development, which always creates social problems, and
buying land, which is very expensive. That is why both projects, Jakarta Waterfront City
and Kapuknaga Waterfront City, will be built on a reclamate land.
Jakarta Waterfront City will be built inside the boundary of the city of Jakarta, and
therefore will be approved, managed, and initiated by the City Government of Jakarta.
Kapuknaga Waterfront City will be built inside the boundary of the Tangerang District
(part of West Java Province), and therefore will be approved, managed, and initiated by
the Provincial Government of West Java. In theory, both provincial governments (the City
of Jakarta, because of its size and importance, is a provincial government level) should
work together closely. However, the Kapuknaga Waterfront City is much more likely to
be constructed than its "sister" because the West Java Province succeeded in attracting
investors who established as the Kapuknaga Indah Corporation.
The project will be located off-shore of Kapuknaga, a part of Tangerang District in
West Java. The east end of the project will be connected to Jakarta and the new off-shore
boundary of Jakarta Waterfront City (see map 1).
2 BOTABEK consists of three districts around Jakarta: Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi.
Map 1
Jakarta Metropolitan Area and the Location of the Project
DAERAH PROYEK
The developer is planning to build a new city for 600,000 citizens on an
approximately 9,000 hectares of land, which 5,000 ha of it are on sea (reclamated land).
The project is planned to be finished in the year of 2025.
Currently, the location consists of irrigated ricefields, mangrove forests, and fishing
villages, where most of the residents are low income fishermen. When the project was
initiated, a lot of opposition came up because the current residents will be forced to move,
and because the irrigated ricefields and the mangrove forests will be gone. An interesting
point to notice is that the existence of irrigated ricefields and mangrove forests are
protected by the law. Because of their economic value, irrigated ricefields in Java are
protected by Presidential Decree3 . Mangrove forests are protected by Environmental
Law4 and Spatial Planning Law5 , due to their status as an endangered ecosystem. The
existence of the project is regarded as a violation of these regulations, and yet it secured a
new Presidential Decree6 to support the justification to remove those uses.
In addition to its political problems, the project also creates new anxiety among
environmentalists. Many have questioned the project's ability for not inducing new
problems toward the city of Jakarta, such as heavy seasonal floods. Jakarta, and a part of
Tangerang coasts, including Kapuknaga, has been known to be prone to annual floods
during rainy season. Heavy rains, small drainage outlets, and the fact that the centre part
of the city is considerably lower than sea level creates hazardous floods that have
produced misery among the overpopulated area and damaged various infrastructure and
transportation system, not to mention causing huge economic losses. Many scientists
hypothesised that adding filled land in the outlet of the area's main drainage system will
worsen the floods.
Another important feature of the project is that its existence will caused impacts on
the surrounding existing development. Even though the project will be created in a
relatively new, "vacant" land, the surrounding part of Kapuknaga is quite well developed.
3 Presidential Decree No. 17/1994
4 Env. Law/Act No. 4/1982, where later on renewed as Act No. 23/1997
5 Spatial Planning Law/Act No. 24/1992
6 Presidential Decree No 73/1995
People consider its impacts on the existing neighbouring international airport, not just
because of the emerging of high-rise buildings which can endanger flying manoeuvres, but
also because its existence will create additional urban growth that can infiltrate buffer
zones in the surrounding airport, and create worsened floods which will endanger the
airport's runways and other infrastructure. On the coast side, reclamation will create
problems with the existing power generator of Muara Karang. The power generator uses
steam as its energy source, relying on seawater as a cooling agent. The new reclamation
land is feared to cause problems in sea current and affecting the process of the generator's
cooling water intake and outlet system.
The main stakeholder in this case is the provincial government. According to
Presidential Decree, the Provincial Government of West Java is the initiator and owner of
the project. It is during development they are allowed to join private investors in
financing. However, from the very beginning of planning, construction, and later on estate
management, will be conducted by the government through the company of Kapuknaga
Indah Corp.
3.2.2 Case 2: Freeport Copper and Gold Mines
Freeport Corporation is a New Orleans-based copper mining company that has
operated on the island of Irian Jaya since 1967. The company was one of the first foreign
investors in Indonesia and therefore has several privileges in their contract with the GOI
that other similar foreign investors do not have. Later, such privileges became the cause
of disputes, especially since the company has succeeded in acquiring the biggest gold
deposit and prolonged their contract based on agreements that many Indonesians found as
unfair.
The reason this company is chosen as one of the case studies in this thesis is mostly
because its activities had caused severe environmental damage. Together with the fact
that the company is also causing social unrest and creating political disputes, it provides an
example of how the theory of environmental planning interacts with institutional
constraints.
In 1967, Freeport Corporation established Freeport Indonesia Company (FIC), a
joint venture firm with the government of Indonesia and a well-known Indonesian mining
company. According to the first contract7, Freeport Co. owned FIC 80%, while the GOI
had 10% and the private Indonesian company owned another 10%8. Based on this
contract, FIC paid 1.5 to 3.5% royalty of copper sales and 1% of gold sales to the G019 .
From the first contract, FIC was eligible to extract 160,000 tons of copper per day in
Grasberg mountains. Besides copper, FIC can also produce as much as 2 tons of gold for
the past 20 years.
In early 1990s, environmentalists and local people started to express their deep
concerns about the way the company had operated. First of all, FIC was using an open-pit
technology, causing damage to almost 30 square km of land, forests, and riverbeds. Its
tailings0 are blamed as the cause of water poisoning and river erosion because they were
dumped into the rivers.
Second, the company ignites social unacceptance from the locals. The project is
located in the habitat area of various primitive indigenous people. These indigenous
people were still conducting tribal wars, hunting and poaching, which occasionally
disturbed the mining activity. Because their traditional lifestyle and low education had
made them ineligible and unable to fit mining jobs, they were excluded from any FIC's
activities since the beginning of the contract. As a result, the relationship between the
locals and FIC was not friendly. After 20 years, the locals blamed FIC for stealing their
traditional land without giving them any compensation, decreasing their hunting area,
poisoning their water sources, and making too little contribution to local development.
Some tribes demanded direct royalty payments to them, as compensation of the damages
that FIC created. An important event occurred in 1996, when a group of local people
kidnapped several scientists and foreigners with the demand of getting FIC out from Irian
7 Also known as Kontrak Karya Generasi I (KK-G 1), a 35-year copper mine exploitation contract with
the Government of Indonesia. It started in 1967 and will be expired at the beginning of the year 2003.
8 Kompas, January 24, 1997. Changes in Freeport Contract. Jakarta.
9 Kompas, December 9, 1996. Do not Repeat Mistakes Like Freeport which only Benefit Foreigners.
Jakarta
10 Tailing is "leftover" materials from mine extraction, resulting from the separation of copper/gold from
the rest of the mass. In FIC, about 0.64 grams of gold will produce a ton of tailing.
Jaya. The kidnapping ended several months later but had successfully attracted
international attention.
These concerns first erupted in 1991, when GOI renewed the contract with FIC
despite the fact that the first one had not expired yet. The company obtained access to
new deposits in neighbouring land, which granted them the capability to expand its copper
production from 160,000 to 300,000 tons per day, and increase its gold production from 2
tons to 42 tons". To support such extensive activities, the company was planning to
conquer 2.9 million hectares of land, consisting several watershed ecosystems from the
most important rivers in northern Irian Jaya and several mountains ecosystems. That is the
reason why FIC felt the necessity to renew the contract.
Notwithstanding environmentalists outcries, the GOI approved the contract with
new terms which were intended to gain more benefits for the GOI. Under the second
generation contract (KK G-2), FIC was forced to plan its new activities carefully,
conducting a proper environmental protection management, and actively participating in
local development. These requirements provoked more oppositions. Because such
requests were exceptionally difficult but quickly agreed by FIC, people were questioning
their commitment. Furthermore, many doubted that the requirements would reduce the
potential for environmental disaster. Many are concerned that such requirements will be
only "official" requirements and merely used to justify the existence of FIC in Indonesia.
The location of the project is in the northern part of Irian Jaya, Indonesia. It
consists of 100 square km of mines and about 2,890 square km of supporting area which
will be transformed into 3 new towns, airport, seaport, and tailing dumping area. The
mine is located on the mountainous area of Carstenz and Grasberg at an altitude of over
4,000 m above sea level. The new towns and other supporting infrastructure, such as the
airport, will spread on high to low plateau with the altitude from 2,000 to 1,000 m above
the sea level, while the seaport will be located at Amamapare, on the coast of Arafuru sea.
The mine extensively covers alpine zone mountainous ecosystems, the only mountainous
area in Indonesia which has snow. The dumping area covers the whole Ajkwa watershed
" The new-found gold deposit has the production potential of over 82.3 million ounces, considered to be
one of the biggest in the world (Kompas, March 16, 1996).
ecosystem which will pass through the Lorentz rainforest protection area and end in the
coastal ecosystem of Amamapare. The new towns are to be located mostly in rainforests.
In short, the project will be responsible for changing an incredibly extensive complex of
ecosystems.
Important stakeholders in this case are the central government, particularly the
Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Freeport Indonesia Corporation, and several important
indigeneous people that lived on the located project. As noted, these people have a low
standard of living and are relatively separated from the modern civilisation. They are:
" The Tribe of Amungme
Amungme tribe has most of their habitat in the mountainous area. Most of the mine's
area is located in their traditional land, which is often regarded as "hunting area".
Since they are not familiar with the formal land titles and land rights, many of them can
not understand why FIC started to prohibit them to enter the mine's area. Due to this
land title transfer and intensive forest destruction, a significant portion of their hunting
area has disappeared, causing the Amungme to move and "intervene" other tribe's
hunting area.
e The Tribe of Moni
This tribe has the nearest hunting area with the Amungme. Mining activities also
affect their ecosystem, especially by causing forest disappearance that made many
animals fled. This tribe is also the one that constantly has land disputes with the
Amungme, due to rapid intervention from them to their area.
* The Tribe of Komoro
The tribe of Komoro inhabits the lower area, mostly in the plain and coastal area.
New towns, service centres and other infrastructure are mostly located in their area.
This new development will affect their lifestyle, since the "urbanisation" will attract
new migrants. Social and economic change will happen to this tribe, and many are
concerned with their ability to compete with newcomers. Furthermore, this tribe is
also the one that utilises the river Ajkwa, polluted by the tailings, as their main water
resource. The anxiety of poisoning their health, as well as decreasing their fish
productivity, is very high.
Map 2
Irian Jaya and the Location of FIC Project
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4. The Organisation of the Study
As a map for the following chapters, the organisation of this study will be
conducted in this sequence:
Chapter 1
This chapter has explained why this study is being conducted. A brief introduction
on the topic as well as the cases has been presented. The most important point in chapter
A is that the focus of the study will be examining the institutional aspect in linkaging
spatial planning and EIA effectively.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 provides problem definition and formulation. It is basically aimed to
give a detail understanding of problems in environmental planning implementation.
Consequently, this chapter will provide brief history of spatial planning and EIA to support
reasonings and evidence of their institutional set up. Comparison between the formal
procedure and the cases real practice is given.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 provides analysis and judgments about the importance of improving the
institutional set-up. Case studies will be used as illustration of each reasonings.
Hopefully, at the end of this chapter, readers will understand and be convinced about the
need to prioritise institutional improvement to solve the problem.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 serves as a summary of potential solutions. Each solution will be
discussed according to its importance and level of priority, along with the advantage and
disadvantage that need to be resolved.
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING
IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
In order to support sustainable development effectively, the Government of
Indonesia had no alternative besides pushing the practice of environmentally-sound
planning. However, why spatial plan and EIA were chosen to be the main tools? Is there
any other alternative? What are the consequences of using them as environmental planning
tools? Are they adequate to answer current development problems in Indonesia? Are
they useful?
To answer these questions, we must recognise each tool's function and the
reasoning of using them. To achieve this, historical highlights of their development will be
described first, then followed by further analysis on their position in environmental
planning policy today. Second, we will see how they are suppose to work according to
the regulation. To summarize it, a diagram of the formal procedure of environmental
planning will be used. Third, a comparison analysis of the appropriate procedure and the
cases' actual implementation will provide explanations of the cause of inconsistent
practice. A summary of the findings will end the analysis.
5.Concept, Structure and Hierarchy of Environmental
Planning Policy
Why spatial plan and EIA? This question actually contains several questions that
are more detailed: What are their positions in the history of planning and development in
Indonesia? What are their achievements that justified their use as formal planning tools
today? How do they relate to the problems in Indonesia's development? How well their
supporting institutions being set-up? I hope that the answers of all of the above questions
can provide understanding on spatial plan and EIA existence in Indonesia.
The following sections will discuss spatial planning and EIA separately according
to this organization: a) the history of their existence in planning policy in Indonesia that
explain their relations to the current development problems and justify their use as formal
planning tools, b) their structure and basic concept, and c) their institutional set-up.
5.1 Spatial Planning
There were two distinctive periods of spatial planning implementation in Indonesia:
prior 1992 and after 1992. The introduction of Act No. 24 in 1992 had restructured the
whole concept of spatial planning, both in term of definition and institutional set-up,
therefore confusions and adjustments were still marking present practices. Though this
study will be based on the current system, it is best to recognize both periods' practices in
order to understand the complexity of the problem.
An important point to consider is the definition of spatial planning in Indonesia,
which is constantly being confused by many stakeholders, that contributes to the
exaggeration of the problem. In common term, 'spatial' planning in Indonesia tends to be
associated with land allocation planning only. This resulted in a separated handling with
sector planning, such as the national agriculture planning, forestry planning, transmigration
and resettlement planning, and infrastructure planning. Later, the GOI recognized that the
inclusion of sector planning in the definition was necessary because the products were
similar to spatial plans, only differently called and regulated. Though the 1992 act
integrated sector planning with land allocation, it is important to know that prior practices
to that period had produced complex institutional problems as well as inefficiency and
ineffectiveness in planning implementation. These problems are persisted, though
appeared relatively in a lesser extent over time.
5.1.1 The History of Spatial Planning
After the nation's independence from Japan in 1945, the newly government of
Indonesia acquired all the land from the colonials as the nation's property, and took all the
responsibility to control and regulate its distribution and allocation. Consequently,
individual land ownership was not fully established or recognized. Instead of ownership,
the government-appointed agency only issues the right to use the land. Such condition
had made spatial planning process rarely recognized local participation and fully dependent
on the government.
The 'evolution' of government regulations in spatial planning reflects the path of
the country's maturity in development. The GOI issued Act No. 24 in 1992 to support the
relaxation of their foreign investment regulation that created demands of high flexibility in
land utilization. Accompanied by international recognition of environmental protection,
rapid pollution growth, and strong movement to eliminate central government
intervention, the act forced the central government to delegate planning authorization to
the local government and encourage public participation. However, because the country
still need a fully integrated and controlled development, the act was limiting autonomy and
emphasized more on the obedience to refer to national level plans. The role of central
government was still as important as before.
a. Prior 1992
Spatial planning in Indonesia was under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Home
Affair. This was because the institution was responsible in regional governments' co-
ordination. It was widely accepted that the fate of spatial planning in Indonesia depended
on this ministry.
The establishment of local governance in Indonesia was depending on the level of
development in the area. The more complex the economic activity in that area, the more
established the local government institution being set-up. Therefore, only cities,
municipalities, and urban areas were the ones that have special attention and handling by
the local government. Only urban areas had spatial or land use plans at those times. This
had left the majority of non-urban lands 'unplanned' and handled directly sector agencies.
Consequently, various problems of uncoordinated land development, ineffective land use,
and undervalued land price scattered around the country.
In 1989, the Minister of Home Affairs issued the Regulation on Spatial Planning',
which was regulating the hierarchy of spatial plan and emphasizing the local government's
authority in conducting regional planning. However, it is important to note that though
the regulation was clarifying and restructuring the system of planning into a more
systematic hierarchy, its main target was urban area. The importance of including non-
urban area into the system was not fully recognized.
The effect of such situation was the emergence of the role of Ministry of Public
Works in introducing comprehensive planning. Since this agency's jurisdiction was not
limited into urban areas only, they proved to be more successful in producing integrated
planning in a region. Furthermore, since the agency had more resources than the local
government to ensure the implementation of their plans, the agency also proved to be
more dependable and consistent in local development. The local government's failure in
implementing plans, due to lack of financial resources, had decreased their version of
spatial plans' popularity. It was during that time that the "rivalry" between Ministry of
Home Affair via local government and the Ministry of Public Works sharpened. It was
widely known at that time that a particular municipality might have more than one version
of spatial plans that were uncompromisingly different to each other.
New problems had risen when the GOI launched deregulation in banking and
industrial sectors in 1989. These two policies attracted foreign investments and eliminated
difficulties for domestic investors to gain access to banking loans. Consequently, mega
industrial projects, such as oil refinery and mining, were booming and demanded fully
utilized service areas. The GOI through the Agency of National Development Planning
(BAPPENAS), backed up by the Presidential Decree No. 57/1989, took the initiative to
integrate national plan to attract and accommodate such projects2. Important areas and
enclaves, due to their advantages in natural resources and location, received special
attention and developed rapidly under full supports by the central government. The
disadvantage of such handling was the tendency to by-pass the local government authority
1 Minister of Home Affair Regulation No. 57/1989
2 Formed in the document of National Strategy of Spatial Planning and Development, an embryo of the
National Spatial Planning which is formally legalised in 1997 through Government Regulation No.
47/1997
in decision making. Consequently, the new projects often created further complication
and confusion in local planning. It is important to note that these 'special areas' were tend
to be exclusive and separated from the development system of the surrounding areas
because most of them were located in undeveloped non-urban areas. Pressed by the fact
that such areas were untouched by the current spatial planning regulation, the GOI
encouraged individual developers to create individual management authority. Later, these
areas had problems of uncoordinated planning efforts due to dualism of planning
autonomy.
Inconsistencies in task authorization and institutional responsibility have led to
long-term effects' problems, such as: a) disintegration of multi-level planning, b) land
competition caused by uncoordinated sector planning, c) unnecessary practices of central
government intervention in local/regional planning and development, and d) a tendency to
distrust local government's capability to manage planning and development co-ordination.
These problems persisted in the following period up to current time.
b. 1992 - present
The reasons of why Act No. 24 was approved in 1992 were the importance of: a)
recognizing local autonomy, b) integrating urban and non-urban planning, c) including
sector planning in spatial planning, d) integrating every level of planning, and, e)
recognizing environmental protection in spatial planning. Strong pressures from foreign
and domestic investors to modernize planning regulation were the keys in acknowledging
the problems. Since 1989, industrial sectors demanded land as much as 40,000 ha, while
another 160,000 ha of rural and agriculture land was converted to urban areas, mostly in
the form of large-scale sub urban housing areas. Overall, the level of newly urban
development in Indonesia from 1989 to 1994 is 1.5 times bigger than similar development
since 1967 - 1989. On the other hand, the GOI and private investors converted millions of
hectares of natural rain forests into plantations, mines, and ricefields. These numbers were
still rising. This condition proved to create disasters in the environment.
The new act strongly emphasized the importance of determining the formal
boundary between development and protection function in all level of planning, in both
urban and non-urban areas. Furthermore, instead of focussing in land allocation, the act
recognized water uses allocation and management as well as air protection and
management.
One of the most important features in this act was the determination of
environmentally sensitive areas. Easily recognized as a derivation of Agenda 21
agreement, the act listed types of areas and ecosystems that had the legitimization as
protection areas. Though using regulation as a basis to determine protection area in
Indonesia was already practiced before, this act ensured that all parties conduct such
determination. Instead of regulated by the Minister, which drove disintegration and
ineffective implementation, protection areas were regulated in the highest level of law. In
a way, this action did not just ensure a co-ordinate implementation, but also uniformity
across sector and all levels of governance as well.
Fourteen sets of government regulations will explain the act's operational
procedures. Such regulations would include technical guidance for land allocation,
watershed planning, coastal planning, etc. Only one of such regulations had been
approved, the National Spatial Planning (Government Regulation No. 47/1997).
.1.2 The Structure of Spatial Planning Policy
Figure 5.1
Spatial Planning Policy According to Act No. 24/ 1992
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Explanation of the figure above:
National Plan
The national parliament approved National Plan in December 30, 1997 and issued
it in a form of Government Regulation. The Minister of National Development Planning
coordinated its development. Planned in 1: 1,500,000 scale maps, the plan roughly divides
the nation into several functional enclaves, including environmental protection enclaves,
strategic economic industrial enclaves, and nationally important urban enclaves. This plan
will serve as a national guidance until the year of 2020.
This plan served as guidance for all sectors development and all province plans.
The plan financed by national budget.
Provincial Plan (Level I Regional Plan)
Conducted within the provincial boundary, there are 27 of such plans exist in this
country, all of them are designed to be used as guidance until the year 2010 to 2020.
However, due to recent release of the National Plan, these plans need renewals as soon as
possible.
This plan is an integration of all sectors' plans, which directs land, waterbodies, air,
and space allocation and serves as guidance for districts within its boundary. Responsible
for its existence and implementation is the Governor, the highest authority in development
and coordinator of all central governments' projects in the region. The Governor and the
central government will arrange the decision of the funding source of the plan. However,
regardless of whoever financed it, the Provincial Parliament will approved the plan in a
form of Governor's Regulations.
Multiprovince Plan
This plan consists of more than one provincial, due to development that requires
location that spread beyond boundaries. The responsible authority to co-ordinate the plan
is the Minister of National Development Planning and financed by national budget, which
made it a 'national' level plan. However, in term of implementation, both (or more)
Governors have their autonomies to conduct the development in their own region, despite
the requirement to co-ordinate closely with each other at all times.
District/City/Municipality Plan (Level I Regional Plan)
There are various types of region settings at this level. Therefore, the plan in this
level varied from heavy inclination of cities and urban system to rural and agriculture
system. Nevertheless, despite the difference of the basic content, Act No. 24 strongly
recommends basic concept of differentiating the region into development and protection
area. This enhances the importance of protection areas in urban system and cities, which
often are neglected before.
This plan serves as guidance for smaller scale plans within the boundary, initiated
by the public, developers, or any stakeholders. Important to note that the Act does not
regulate any plans below this level to ensure flexibility and enhance public initiative and
participation. Responsible for the co-ordination of the plan are District Chief in district
and municipality areas, and Mayor in cities.
The plan can be financed by District Budget, Provincial Budget, National Budget,
or any combination among the three, depends on the result during budgeting planning.
However, its approval is being conducted at the District/Level II parliament.
Multi District/Cities/Municipalities Plan
Almost similar to Multiprovince Plan, level II plans that consist of more than one
district, municipalities or cities often regarded as level I project (one level above) because
the responsible official for its co-ordination is the Governor. Co-ordination among the
related District Chiefs or Mayors is very important to ensure similar progress. Important
to note that usually this plan exists because of special projects across boundaries,
conducted by private developers or central government projects, therefore most of them
do not worry much about the comprehensiveness of the implementation across regions.
The approval of this plan is being conducted at Level I parliament.
Special Region Plan
Special region plans exist for important regional projects that do not fulfill
administrative boundary requirements. For these plans, the Act requires integration and
co-ordination with the related official region plans, though still emphasizes the autonomy
given to whoever initiate the plan. Examples of such plans are New Towns or New Cities,
Tourism Belt, Mega Industrial Complex, Multination Investment Free Zone Area, etc.
The related level of region's parliament gives the approval of special region plan.
However, these projects are mostly initiated by the central government, therefore its
region's approval often does not matter much.
5.1.3 Institutional Set-up of Spatial Planning
Figure 5.2
Institutional Structure of Spatial Planning Policy
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Explanation:
Ministry of Home Affairs
The President delegated the task of coordinating general governance, local
government's autonomy development, and rural development to this ministry. The
minister approved the appointment of governors and chiefs of district and issued basic
guidance about governance through Minister's Decrees. Without it, an elected leader of
the region could not perform the duty because he/she did not have the legal back up from
the central government.
The department was also responsible in coordinating the policy of each region and
sometimes had the capacity to disapprove a certain policy in the name of national co-
ordination and security. In theory, a spatial plan was considered legal once the parliament
of the region had given the approval in a form of Regional Government Regulation
(Perda)3 . However, the Minister can issue a decree to disregard the related Perda.
Agency of National Development Planning (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan
Nasional/BAPPENAS)
This non-departmental agency served as the main assistant to national development
planning to the President. Theoretically, all national plans and development policies came
from this agency, but the agency respected the autonomy of each sector and local
government to initiate their own policies as long as assuredly coordinated. Coordinating
all sectors and local government's plans through budgeting and projects' approval
performed this task. The agency did not have local office or representation in the region
and did not have direct link to the local government. However, because of its capacity to
initiate basic national planning policy, approve budgets and projects, this agency
influenced the practice of environmental planning nationally.
Its position as a co-worker to the Minister of Home Affairs indicated lack of
influence to the local government. This proven questionable since the role of planning
coordinator would not be effectively executed without direct responsibility link. As
mentioned before, this position created rivalry among the two agencies, because the role
of coordinating planning seemed to be overlapping between the two.
Local/Regional Government
The establishment of local/regional governance depended on the level of autonomy
given to a certain region. If this region received full autonomy, the institution set-up
would be well established and had full capacity to execute governance of the area.
However, if the opposite happened, the region, no matter how far they were from the
main government center, must be under the jurisdiction of the nearest local governance.
3 Explained in chapter A, Regional Government Regulation can be issued by the approval of the Region's
Parliament (DPRD). However, in the hierarchy structure of law and regulation in Indonesia, regional
The Ministry of Home Affairs granted this autonomous status and its approval depends on
many things, for example political and security reasons.
The local government consists of
1. Provincial Government/Level I Governance headed by the Governor.
In theory, the Governor was directly responsible to the President, however, they
were still reporting to the Ministry of Home Affairs.
As the head of its region, governor was the responsible actor in initiating spatial
planning process. In theory, they had the freedom to conduct the procedure without
interference as long as they did faithfully co-ordinate all sectors' interests and plans and
integrate them in their spatial plans. However, because of funding inadequacy, spatial
plans were usually being financed by the central government's (through Ministry of
Home Affair) funds. This was the reason why the Minister of Home Affair acquired
the right to influence the content of spatial planning.
2. District/Cities/Municipalities Government often called Level II Governance.
District, was a region consist of several urban centers and their hinterlands. The
head of this region is Head of District.
Cities and municipalities were usually smaller than districts but consisted of well-
established urban areas. They earned a similar level of governance with district
because of their complexity and advanced development. The head of this region was
Mayor. Just like the Governor, both Head of Districts and Mayors were responsible
to the region's planning. However, their autonomy was also not fully recognized.
Consequently, intervention of the content always occurred, which resulting in low
consistencies of actual implementation.
Serving to both Governor and Head of Districts in regional planning was the
Planning Department (BAPPEDA) in provincial and district level. This department was
the appointed institution to co-ordinate spatial planning process. In theory, they were the
ones who made the plans, but contracted to an outside consultant. All process of
appointing the eligible private consultant, which included advertising the project,
choosing, and appointing the "winner", were conducted by this agency.
government regulation is lower than the regulation of a minister.
Important Sector Ministries
Such as:
" Ministry of Agriculture (Departemen Pertanian)
* Ministry of Transmigration and Forest Dweller Resettlement (Departemen
Transmigrasi dan Pemukiman Perambah Hutan)
e Ministry of Forestry (Departemen Kehutanan)
e Ministry of Mines and Energy (Departemen Pertambangan dan Energi)
* Ministry of Transportation (Departemen Perhubungan)
e Ministry of Public Works
These ministries had direct tasks to administer sector development in the country.
They all had their own local office in the region that served as the agency's representatives
to co-ordinate with the head of the related local government.
These ministries usually initiated their own sector plans, due to their capacity as
initiator and developers of their own projects. Most of them, except the Ministry of Public
Works, had their plans covered non urban areas that seldom included in existing regional
plans, resulting in less possibility of uncoordinated spatial planning than the Ministry of
Public Works. However, this did not ease the situation, especially if the nearest urban
centers expanded and required the integration of boundaries into contradicting uses.
Regional Board of Representatives/Regional Parliament (DPRD) in Level I and II
This institution was a formal form of public participation in governance. As
explained before, this board was consisting of representatives chosen during General
Election. This board should approve Regional/Local Government Regulation, including
the regulation about the spatial plan of the region. However, as mentioned before, though
in theory spatial plan was executable once approved by the DPRD, the Ministry of Home
Affair was powerful enough to object if they consider its content as inadequate.
One important agency that does not have direct influence on spatial planning but
worth mentioned is the Agency of National Land (BPN).
The agency was a central government non-departmental institution, which had
their own local office in regions. The agency was widely known to have a controversial
role in the whole sequence of planning and development. Formed to assist the President in
land administration, the agency served as the only eligible institution in land certification.
Unfortunately, many confused this role as land-use policy maker. This condition provides
the public an impression of a full authorization to produce their own version of land use
and initiate spatial planning individually. Though such situation was not intended to
happen, incidents of "misleading" roles as such occurred a number of times. At the
sequence of development process, this agency was eligible to issue location permit, a
permit to grant a certain developer to acquire a land for their purpose in a certain time.
This permit gave the developer assurance to conduct further planning and development
permit to the local government without the fear of losing the land to other potential
buyers.
Given their role in the sequence of development process above, it was quite
understandable if many parties, including BPN's own officials itself, thought that the
agency had the authority to produce spatial plan policy. However, such condition was not
intended to happen. Served only to certify land titles (including transfers, conversions,
and registrations), the agency will only act according to local government's guidance.
Therefore, the role of planning was still fully under the jurisdiction of the local
government.
5.2 Environmental Impact Assessment
First introduced in 1972, EIA had passed through a series of stages trying to define
its existence in the formal planning in Indonesia. There are three distinctive periods of
EIA implementation in the country, where each represents a distinct development of the
EIA and its role in the formal environmental planning. Those periods are 1972 to 1986,
1986 to 1993, and post 1993.
During these periods, Indonesia had experienced major shifts of development focus
that directly demand special policies in environmental protection. . For example, during
the 1970s up to mid 1980s was the period of "oil boom". Mining sector received most of
investment capital. During this period, the mining industry extensively developed EIA in
order to meet requirements from foreign donor agencies. It was not surprising that this
sector produced the most established EIA methodologies as well as its protocols and
human resources. After that period, non-oil industries and manufacturing started to get
familiar with EIA. Later, the government felt the necessity to formalize EIA as a planning
tool for physical development in the nation.
The shift from each periods was not always smooth, even in many cases had
created new problems. Many realized that the current problems of EIA implementation in
Indonesia mostly came from frictions and difficult adjustments during the policy change in
those periods.
5.2.1 The History of Environmental Impact Assessment
The role of EIA in Indonesia is a planning tool. However, since the concept of
"planning" in the country was highly formalized as a set of strict regulated process, EIA
was mostly used as a formal requirement instead of utilized to enrich the knowledge of
planning. It was not surprising that EIA's development was more focussed on defining its
role in the system than the enrichment of methodologies and scientific views. Such
condition had its advantages and disadvantages. In one hand, many people were
continuously complaining about the low quality of EIA studies in the country, but secretly
expecting it as the most possible solution to "democratize" the planning process by
requiring public participation.
a. 1972 to 1986
In 1972, the World Bank enforced the biggest cement manufacturer, PT Semen
Nusantara, to develop EIA study as a requirement to get their loan. This EIA study was
used as a planning tool to ensure the enlargement of the factory had minimum negative
environmental impacts. The study got national attention so that the single government-
owned oil company in the country, PERTAMINA4 , started to integrate the concept in
their contingency plans. This company used this policy to initiate a positive public image
4 PERTAMINA is an abbreviation of Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Negara (The National Oil
Mining Company), a government-owned company that monopolised oil and natural gas mining in the
country since 1960s until now. The company is lead by a president director, appointed by the Minister of
Mines and Energy. Until today, the company remained to be one of the top major contributors on national
revenues, and still the biggest corporation operating in oil and natural gas industry.
as a pioneer in championing environmental causes as well as an efficiency-oriented
company.
During this time, which happened in the early 1980s, the company, the donor, and
related government agencies established an informal EIA evaluation committee. First, the
team consisted of PERTAMINA's experts and a group of environmental scientists, and
merely served only as a technical team.
Due to its popularity and the global tendency toward environmentally sound
development, the Government of Indonesia issued the first Environmental Law (Act No.
4) in 1982. The Act formalized the use of EIA called AMDAL' in Indonesian, as a
development-planning tool.
To execute the formal EIA operational in the country, the GOI issued the first
Government Regulation for EIA in 1986 (Gov. Reg. No. 29). The regulation emphasized
the importance to use EIA as a requirement to get development permit for all kinds of
projects.
During 1982 to 1986, the GOI were preparing the institutional set up to support
EIA implementation. Though some members of the initial EIA evaluation were officials of
the Ministry of Environment, this institution lacked financial resources that prevented
them to get the authorization as EIA coordinator. Therefore, the GOI highly emphasized
in preparing the local governments and sector agencies as the legally responsible
institutions for evaluating EIA.
b. 1986 - 1993
The most prominent point in EIA implementation during this period was the
establishment of EIA commissions in the central and local government levels. The
Government Regulation No. 29 clearly put EIA as a requirement to get development
license, therefore each sector and local government institutions that directly responsible in
issuing such licenses created their own EIA commission.
There were four effects resulted from this regulation: a) the categorization of EIA
into sector's EIA and region's EIA, b) attempts to directly link EIA with spatial plan, c)
obvious competition among EIA's commissions, and d) a tendency to regard EIA
commissions and project proponents as two opposite parties instead of an integrated team
like it used to be before.
First, the attitude to differentiate EIA into sector and regions was a result from the
establishment of formal EIA commission in sectors and local government institutions.
Each institution had created their own methods and protocols, despite the attempt to
generalize all EIA process into a similar procedure and approach. The effect of such
condition was a high variety of EIA qualities. In one hand, sectors that already had past
experiences like the Department of Mines and Energy commission emphasized the
importance to provide technical guidance to ensure the study was scientifically credible
and acceptable. On the other hand, institutions that did not have the privilege of prior
experiences only managed to provide inadequate technical guidance. At this period, EIA
might be optimally used as a legal requirement but ignored as a planning tool.
Second, the initial attempts to link EIA with spatial planning came from the notion
of using EIA as a planning tool. At that time, the most common formal plans used by all
institutions were spatial plans, therefore everyone had accepted to use EIA as a
complement tool to guard the implementation of spatial plan. The initial understanding
came from the realization that the most important feature in EIA study was the location of
the project. Because the study tended to predict impacts on the environment, the EIA
would not be effective if the project's location unclear. Furthermore, many cases had
shown that EIA evaluation process would stall if protests about the location's eligibility
appeared. In order to reduce such incidents and simplify the procedure, all institutions
agreed to use spatial plan as a basis to give a project's eligibility to present their EIA
documents in front of the commission. If a project was not relating to the spatial plan, a
commission had the right to reject the study or even object the continuation of evaluation
process. Unfortunately, spatial plans did not always agree with sectors' plans. Despite the
initial agreement about the necessity to refer to the spatial plans, many ignored them and
proceed EIA approval over protests from other stakeholders. It was during this time that
5 AMDAL is an abbreviation of Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan, which is widely known as
Environmental Impact Assessment.
reformers began to link both spatial plans and EIAs in procedural linkage as an incentive
to use both.
Third, obvious competition between each EIA commissions was a direct result of
points one and two. The tendency to create specific protocols and methods, as well as
ignore others' stakes was a source of fierce competition between commissions. Most
commissions started to act as a prolonged hand of its own institution's interest, therefore
their objectivity during evaluation notably decreased. Because very little effort had been
conducted to ensure the neutrality of EIA commission's members, the related institutions
used their own commissions to legitimate their own interests in the projects. This
condition ignited the competitive attitude in getting the "project" by ensuring EIA study
submission to their own commission, instead of others.
Fourth, putting EIA commissions and project-proponents as two opposite parties
became obvious. Past experiences always put EIA evaluators and proponents as an
integrated team through a close co-operation to achieve mutual interest. However, when
the numbers of EIA submissions boomed, commissions declined close assistance and
preferred to standardize all treatments that create a noticeable distance with the
proponent. Later, when each party in this situation became less flexible in achieving their
own goals and interests, commissions and proponents placed themselves in opposite
places. As a tool to legitimize development license, this placement was convenient for the
commission to screen eligible and feasible projects. However, such condition did not
support the goal to get optimal solution through mutual interests, instead became more
like a situation of "take-it-or-leave-it".
c. 1993 -now
During late 1980s and early 1990s investment in complex manufacturing and real
estate sector boomed. Mega projects, which consisted of a set of multitude projects
erected and became popular among the investors. Examples for such projects were
integrated timber plantation with pulp and paper factory mills, integrated new towns,
integrated petrochemical industry (this include oil refinery to plastic compounds factory),
and integrated infrastructure projects (such as dam, irrigation, and rice fields openings).
These types of project demanded an integrated response from the government.
The currently used "sector" bureaucracy in permitting as well as development
monitoring and post construction compliance could not effectively serve these investors.
The investors must process their legal requirements into multitude agencies, each with
different set of rules and attitudes. This condition disfavored the investors and made the
country's competitiveness relatively low.
Aware that new developing nations around the world had liberated their
regulations in order to attract foreign investments, the GOI released a new set of policy
called October 1993 Package6 that provide an integrated policy regarding the treatment of
foreign investors. The package had included the relaxation of some of the requirements as
well as the simplification of obtaining the license procedures in planning, construction, and
post development compliance. The most prominent feature from this package was the
introductions of "one-stop service" procedural set up, which forced sectors and local
government to closely co-ordinate and redefine their current tasks in order to create a
more simple institutional bureaucracy.
The new EIA policy, Government Regulation No. 51, was introduced and then
eliminating the use of Government Regulation No. 29. Supporting the whole concept of
October 1993 Package, EIAs were forced to be treated in an integrated system. The
tendency of "sector's oriented" as well as "region's oriented" should be eliminated. An
investor that had a multiple projects could process their EIAs in just one commission,
instead of hopping one commission after another. Therefore, for example, an integrated
wood and paper industry did not have to process its forestry EIA in the Department of
Forestry Commission then its pulp and paper factory mills EIA in the Department of
Industry Commission separately, but instead processed all of them in an integrated EIA
study evaluated by an integrated commission that consisted of all members from the
related sectors.
6 October 1993 Package is known in Indonesia as Pakto 93, a package of reformation policy in easing
regulations to attract foreign investors. The package was signed by several Ministers, some of them were
the Minister of Industries, the Minister of National Land, the Minister of Environment, the Minister of
Public Works, and the Minister of Home Affair.
To be precise, the new Government Regulation introduced four distinctive EIAs
which each had its own procedural system: a) Project EIA, an EIA for a single project, b)
Integrated EIA, a single EIA study for multiple projects that directly influence one
another, evaluated by an integrated commission chaired by BAPEDAL, c) Estate EIA, and
d) Regional EIA, both were constantly being confused one to another, also evaluated by
integrated commission (except Estate's EIA which falls under the jurisdiction of one
sector). These new ELAs, no matter how confusing they could be, were categorized in a
more simple fashion, therefore reducing the possibility of conflict of interests as well as the
waste of time and money through separate processing.
The effects of the new regulation were a) a declining number of processed EIAs,
b) the emergence power of BAPEDAL (Environmental Impact Management Agency), and
c) the submerging power of regional EIA commissions.
According to point a), the regulation had successfully reduced unnecessary EIA
evaluations through the introduction of integrated commission, therefore eased the
burdens of the investors and taught all sectors to work together. Based on point b),
BAPEDAL, the executive institution of the Minister of Environment for environmental
protection implementation, had new powers in directing EIA evaluations. As an agency
exclusively mandated to manage environmental protection, they used the opportunity as a
chair in integrated commission to push environmental considerations as ultimate goals.
BAPEDAL also managed to increase the quality of the EIA documents by providing the
proponents to use multiple scientific sources and methodologies and emphasizing the
importance of evaluating the credibility of the study instead of arguing about the writing
system and procedural concerns that mostly plaguing sectors' commissions before. This
power had also helped to redefine again the importance of spatial plan in EIA study.
Lastly, according to point c), integrated commission had decreased the importance of
regional commissions. As a local government's hand in EIA evaluation, regional
commission used to place themselves as the guardians of spatial plan implementation and
local government's policy. However, because BAPEDAL took over some of this task,
their role became less important. Worse, many institutions had unconsciously ignored the
importance of local aspirations and interests in a mega project since the central agencies
issued most of the development licenses.
5.2.2 The EIA
Before 1993, EIA was a project per project study. About 15 different sectors7 that
directly responsible in development licenses approval and provincial government that also
eligible in issuing licenses for locally initiated and funded projects, conduct EIA
evaluation. Therefore, in general, there was only one kind of EIA known in Indonesia,
Project-based EIA. However, each sector developed its specific protocols and
methodologies. The difference between one sector to another was not particularly
important, except the way the institution was being set up. The concept of utilizing EIA as
a requirement to obtain development license was widely practiced.
However, with the changing structure of EIA in 1993, each category distinctively
required different role and implementation. This new regulation structurized EIA into:
Project EIA
Project EIA is still being treated as a sector EIA, regarding the fact that the needed
technical specification and requirements are fully under the jurisdiction of the related
sector. Each sector used this EIA as a requirement to get development license. The
sector's commission is conducting evaluation and approval.
Not all kinds of sector development need an EIA to get license. Each sector
usually screens them into the ones that have the criteria of causing important impact. The
Head of BAPEDAL/Minister of Environment Decree determines such criteria. Other
kinds of projects that do not match the criteria are only required to fulfill specific technical
requirements determined by each sector. The Minister of Environment issued a
comprehensive list of projects from all sectors that need to conduct EIA.
Individual Estate (Region) EIA
/ The 15 sectors are: Ministry of Mines and Energy, Forestry, Agriculture, Tourism Post and
Telecommunication, Transmigration and Forest Dwellers Resettlement, Transportation, Public Works,
Industries and Trade (before 1996 is consist of two separate ministries), Health, Home Affairs, Defence,
The Agency of National Atomic Energy/BATAN, The Agency of Technology Research and
Application/BPPT, and BAPEDAL.
Estate or region's EIA is known as AMDAL Kawasan in Indonesia. This
particular EIA applies to projects that will develop a certain region extensively into a
certain estate, for example tourism area, new towns, or even industrial estate. Due to its
relatively homogeneous content, this EIA only requires one sector or institution to
evaluate their EIA and issue the development license.
Integrated EIA
Integrated EIA is required for projects which have multiple components that
support each other's existence but under different sectors. Examples for such project are
pulp and paper factory, which also has its own forest concession'. The licenses need to be
acquired are forest concession license from the Ministry of Forestry and pulp and paper
factory license from the Ministry of Industries and Trade. Because of multisector
involvement, an integrated commission should evaluate the EIA. According to the
Minister of Environment's Decree No. 54/1996, BAPEDAL chairs this commission.
Integrated EIA is regulated in Minister of Environment's Decree No 57/1995,
which basically emphasized that projects eligible to do integrated EIA must meet the
following criteria: a) the project consists of various components which requires approval
by various sectors, b) every components in the project are directly linked in influenced
each other in planning, management, and production process, c) all components are
located in a similar ecosystem, d) all components are under one or more project-
proponents. If one of this criteria is not met, each involving sector has the right to
conduct separated Project EIA evaluation with the agreement from other sectors and the
proponent.
Regional EIA
Regional EIA is often easily confused with Estate EIA and Integrated EIA. The
reason of such confusion is its criteria also involve projects with multiple components in a
certain region. However, this EIA implies multiple components inside the location that do
not necessarily need to complement or support each other. The distinctive difference
8 Forest concession is the right to cut timbers in a certain area. However, since 1996 no more concessions
have been given without the requirement to re-plant and rehabilitate the forest.
between Regional EIA and Estate EIA is the involvement of the sector, which the first one
requires multiple sectors and multiple development licenses, while the later requires only
one eligible sector. On the other hand, the difference between Regional EIA and
Integrated EIA is about the relationship of each component. Regional EIA implies the
unimportance of each component's relation despite the fact that they were built in a same
location, but Integrated EIA emphasizes their dependency on each other.
Though in theory this definition is simple enough, in practice has become a major
source of confusion. Usually, projects fallen under the categories are new towns.
However, not all new towns consist of multiple components. Some new towns can only
be regarded as housing estate, due to its emphasize on housing, and adequate enough to
be evaluated as Estate EIA. Some other new towns may require Integrated EIA, because
its existence depends and directly influence other components (such as industrial activity),
for example mining towns and new industrial towns.
According to the decree of Minister of Environment No 55/1996, Integrated EIA
commission, chaired by BAPEDAL should evaluate Regional EIA.
The sequence of screening a project in order to define its EIA type is in the
following figure.
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5.2.3 Institutional Set-up of EIA Commission
Basic model of EIA commission is in the following figure:
Figure 5.4
Institutional Set-up of EIA Commission
Centra1/ Sector Conunis sion
Regiona/Proviitial Commission
Because EIA is a requirement to get development permits, most commissions are
being set up in planning division of the related institution. However, though each
commission is directly influencing the outcome of the evaluation, they have the
responsibility to include other agencies as temporary/ad hoc members in the commission.
According to the figure, central/sector commission consists of a) chairman of
commission, usually the Secretary General of the related Minister (Secretary General is
often called as the Secretary of the Minister, a position that is roughly equal with Vice
Minister), b) permanent members that mostly are technical experts in the Ministries, c)
BAPEDAL officials, d) temporary members that usually other members from other
ministries, agencies, universities, all temporarily appointed by the chief, d) NGO
representatives, and e) representatives from the related local government (usually
representatives from regional commission).
The provincial government established regional commissions. Furthermore, if each
district established their own commission, some districts may not work at all, due to the
fact that not all districts in Indonesia is "busy enough" with project and investment
proposals in their area. These commissions are consist of a) chairman of commission,
usually the Secretary of Region (this position is also roughly equal to Vice Governor), b)
permanent members from important local and regional offices, both from the Governor's
office and local offices from each sector, c) temporary members from central government
agency officials, including BAPEDAL, invited if needed, d) temporary members from
other local offices, universities, or experts, d) NGO or local people representatives, e)
representatives from the related district government.
During decision making, the chairman of commission has the right to steer
decision, though members can formally object with the result through official statements.
This condition comes from the fact that, in theory, the related sector or region is more
familiar with technical and political requirement in approving or rejecting the proponent's
EIA.
With the introduction of Integrated EIA Commission, rights and tasks from each
member of the commission is distinctively different with the ones shown above. The
important differences consist of
1) The role of EIA chairman
EIA chairman in integrated commission does not have the right to veto or make a
decision without the approval from all members, because of (see point 2)
2) The type of commission's membership
Unlike sector or regional commission, an integrated commission consists of
commission bodies. Membership is not based on individuals but based on agencies or
sectors. If one member disagrees with the outcome of the commission, they have the
right to object to the chairman, and that the chairman must postpone the final decision
until mutual agreement or solution is achieved (see point 3). Such disagreement may
reflect institutions' conflict of interest, and the result can be political. The disagreed
institution has the right for not issuing any required license, therefore canceling the
project-proponent in pursuing its project operation. Such condition has made
integrated commission bear heavy political content that requires unnecessary meetings
to neutralize it.
3) Decision making process
Related to point 2), integrated commission depends on mutual agreement in decision
making, while such condition is not highly emphasized on sector commission. As
explained in point 2), multiple informal meetings are usually being conducted in
integrated commission to avoid "unfinished" meeting. This is a way to communicate
and express mutual interests without thinking its political content. Such situation,
however, seldom optimized which made the outcome of informal meetings unnoticed
at the actual meeting.
5.3 The Relationship between Spatial Planning and EIA
The whole sequence of environmental planning and development procedure is in
figure 5.5 below:
Figure 5.5
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As seen in the figure before, there are two distinctive steps in planning procedures
that the proponent of Kapuknaga project had chosen:
1) Spatial Planning Procedure
According to formal requirements, a project must meet the technical requirement of
land allocation from spatial plan. Therefore, the project proponents must use the
spatial plan to choose locations that suited their intentions. In Kapuknaga case, the
available land policy did not support the project. The project, which aimed to develop
a new city, must convert most of the protected agriculture area. However, instead of
rejecting the project, the local government changes the plan to fit the project. Such
condition made the sequence of spatial planning upside down, because as seen in the
figure, the project proposal and location permit approval came before the plan was
established.
2) EIA Procedure
According to formal requirements, EIA should be conducted after location permit is
granted. Therefore, it means that they are conducted after the related spatial plan
"approved" the project. The bottom line is that EIA should not be conducted if there
is no legal spatial plan is available. Even if the project had strong political backup,
EIA still must be conducted after a proper spatial plan was established. In this case,
EIA was already conducted although the required plan is not finished yet.
Furthermore, many parties started to demand EIA's approval before spatial plan based
on the reason that its outcomes can be useful as inputs to the establishment of the plan.
Why did this situation happen? According to various interviews with the related
government agencies' officials, there were several reasons that a different outcomes
plaguing the implementation of the procedure:
1) Lack of Proper Spatial Policy
In 1980s, Kapuknaga was one of the most productive agriculture areas in Java.
The GOI already spent a lot of money in developing irrigation infrastructure.
However, its productivity declined continuously. This partly caused by rapid urban
growth and labor transformation from agriculture to industrial sector. The local
government designed and supported most of these changes. Such transformation
continuously happened because spatial plan is unavailable, especially because
Kapuknaga was not an important urban center at that time.
Disputes over land conversion often erupted between the local government
versus the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Public Works. Well aware that
such condition could jeopardize the fate of the agriculture area, it seems appropriate to
ask the President to issue a Decree to protect the area, which would eliminate any
disagreement. Since agriculture sector was a priority during the 1980s development
agenda, the decree regarded the agriculture enclave as "undisturbable".
When spatial planning process were regulated in 1992, the local government
did not possess proper information to decide best uses for their area. As a follow up,
the Provincial Government of West Java copied Minister of Public Works urban policy
for its own provincial plan, issued in 1994. The plan still emphasized the importance
of protecting the agriculture function in northern Tangerang district, including
Kapuknaga.
However, the local government started to realize that they had miscalculated
the land market just after approving the plan. The agriculture enclave was disappearing
and rapid urban growth and high demand on land transfers was rising continuously.
This lack of proper insights had driven the government to rethink its spatial plan
content.
2) Strong Forces from the Market
"Underground" movement of a certain big developer to acquire Kapuknaga
land was surprisingly effective. They were able to persuade the local government
about the advantage of the project. Furthermore, they even able to request the
Governor to propose the President to disregard the protection area decree. This was a
proof of how strong market force were when it comes to weakening a policy.
Supported by the fact that private connection as well as collusion between the
project investors and high officials played an important part in changing the situation.
It was no longer a secret that giant corporations could have direct access to central
agencies, even to many of the top officials there.
3) Weak Compliance and Commitment from the Government
It was a major surprise then that in 1995 the Provincial Government itself
countered its own spatial policy. Though many people were aware about the "market
forces", people had not expected that the local government would disregard their own
policy so abruptly as if their own spatial plan were not there at all. The fact that the
Governor himself was proposing to the President to overrule his decree on agriculture
protection and, indirectly, the Government Regulation over Kapuknaga protection
plan was considered to be an act of uncommitment conduct.
According to the norm of proper planning, a spatial plan policy was eligible to
evaluate after 5 years. Furthermore, if one thought that the policy requires changes,
the local government must propose the new plan to the local Board of Representatives
and get the approval. In this case, the Governor did not bother to wait until the five
years time of the Provincial Plan expired. According to law, since Presidential Decree
was clearly higher than Government Regulation (issued by the local Board of
Representatives as a legal approval of the spatial planning policy), it overrule the
Provincial Board of Representatives approval for converting the agriculture enclave.
Approval from the representatives were no longer needed, therefore provided the
Governor an excuse to ignore them.
4) The Present Opportunity to use District Plan as a counter to Provincial Plan
To make matters more complicated, the District Government of Tangerang
was encouraged to issue the district spatial plan that would accommodate the new
project, regardless the content of the current provincial plan was. Once this district
plan was legally approved, the project would have proper spatial plan back up.
Based from legal point of view, the whole sequence of policy making in
Kapuknaga project is not right. The project did not meet the requirement in the
current provincial plan, and the draft of the District Plan did not follow the provincial
policy guidance. Under the legal basis, the project was eligible to be objected, but
unfortunately would not be since there was a Presidential Decree that overrule any
objection under the President's level.
5) The Unique Role of EIA
According to the Government Regulation No. 51/1993, the proponent can start
EIA study if the proposed project's location met the requirement. This means that the
project allocation met the requirement of the related local government's spatial policy.
If no district plan is available, one should refer to the plan one level higher.
In Kapuknaga case, no district plan was available, and the provincial plan did
not approve a mixed-use function in the location. Therefore, the Governor asked the
President to issue a new decree, which would disregard the content of Provincial Plan.
Then, the district plan was developed based on the new Presidential Decree.
The new district plan must be used as a legal basis for EIA study. However,
since the plan was not finished yet, the EIA study was "informally" conducted.
Currently, EIA study and spatial planning are conducted simultaneously, though legal
approval must be given to the plan first instead of the EIA. The logical explanation of
this situation was that: a) unnecessary length of time can be eliminated, and b) both
studies can interact, that is each finding can be used to support the other study.
The above example is illustrating inconsistencies for urban development projects.
This type of project usually won local government approvals because of the comparative
economic advantage that they provide. Furthermore, the land and labor market usually
supports this project. It is not easy to prevent the local people to sell their lands or change
their jobs if previous use is no longer profitable.
Would the same situation happen to non-urban projects? Would the support of
local government and the driving force of land market strong enough to overrule existing
policy?
The following discussion will be the comparison between the formal procedure and
the one practiced at the Freeport Gold and Copper Mines project.
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Similar to the previous case, the proponent of Freeport project had chosen several
steps:
1) Spatial Planning Procedure
Just like previous case, the proponent did not use the spatial plan as guidance but only
as a formality. Consequently, its existence is being "manipulated" to fit the project's
designs and requirements. The plan in this case is unnoticed before the emerging need
to conduct EIA is becoming more pressing.
2) EIA Procedure
The uniqueness of EIA procedure in this case is the emergence of various studies prior
it. Furthermore, the government only used EIA as the instrument to justify the
presence of the project. A unique finding in this case is that there is no necessity to
link EIA with the spatial plan, aside from the legal requirement.
There are several important points that need to be mentioned in discussing about
how the procedure in this case differ with the formal one and also differ with the
Kapuknaga case:
1) Comparative Advantage of Granting the Project
This project created a lot of income to the country. This particular reason was
strong enough to justify the comparative advantage of granting the project.
Furthermore, without the project, the land was almost unproductive. Beside forests,
there were no significant productive use occurred in the area.
When being compared to the disadvantages that the project could create, a
surprising finding unexpectedly supported the decision of granting the project. In a
matter of better off or worse-off for the local people, granting or rejecting the project
did not matter much. If granting the project would create dissatisfaction among the
indigenous people that lost their land, it also provided opportunity of compensation
and exposure to the modern civilization. That might reflect in a better social service,
chance for education, and economic growth. On the other hand, if rejecting the
project would mean protection for their daily activity, these people would still live in a
civilization that matched those in the Stone Age.
Supported by the fact that environmental costs of the damage it would induce
were "balanced" enough with the potential income (this calculation was conducted by
the Minister of Mines and Energy), the project seemed to have enough justification to
present. However, only economic advantage was the only strong reason to accept the
project. Controversy was still rising and none of the involved stakeholders in this
project was actually 100% satisfied and secured.
2) The Competitive Role between the Local Government and the Central
Government
This case opened the old "wound" of planning dichotomy between the local
and the central government. The Minister of Mines and Energy already issued
development permit, even before the issuance of location permit. Such situation
illustrated how severe central government intervention could be and that played a
major contribution on the damage of the system.
3) The Role of Spatial Plan as an Information Source
Freeport project is a classic study of Indonesian government treatment to non-
urban areas. Initial regional information was unavailable, visionary policies for
development were not considered yet, the local government institution and its
supporting system was in a low quality, and the central government intervened too
much. As explained before, the District of Mimika, where the project was located, did
not possess any spatial policy guidance whatsoever, even though Freeport mine was
already existed since the early 1970s. It was when the issue of FI's area enlargement
became highly publicized; the stakeholders realized the importance of spatial planning.
Not only because of its capability to provide coherent guidance in the area's
development, but also because of its capability to serve as a legal back up for the
project.
When Freeport Indonesia expressed interest on extending their permit, the GOI
realized that there was no information available for reference. This was not just
slowing any important decision making, but also endangering their position during
bargaining. The fact that FI proposed the extension long before their first contract
expires raised suspicion among the public that the company must be holding the real
"card".
Though in theory spatial plan was no longer needed because the development
permit of the project was already issued, the local government still insisted on the
finishing of it, because of:
e Recognition of the area's potential and resources
Aware that the island was abundant with natural resources, the provincial
government emphasized the need to collect and coordinate as much
information about it as possible. Spatial planning was a good way to make
such efforts efficient and complete, especially since its purpose was also to
integrate all sectors' policies and participation. This spatial plan would be
useful to "market" other area and resources to other future investors.
" Recognition of a bargaining power
Parallel with the fact that the central government already issued the ultimate
permit, the local government used the spatial plan as bargaining power for
implementation. The plan might no longer useful in giving guidance of what
was allowed or not, but it provided opportunities to "trade" and distribute the
responsibility of regional development to the investors. For example, the local
government might insist on the provision of transportation facilities to the
investor. The downside of this opportunity was the possibility of bribes and
corruption among officials.
Few of the most important outcomes from the plan that directly influenced FI
operation were the recognition of Lorentz Preservation Area. This recognition had
forced FI to acknowledge potential hazards from their operation to the future of
possible uses, and forced the Minister of Mines and Energy to acknowledge other
interests from other Ministries and the local government.
4) The Role of Additional and Supporting Studies
Because of the special role that the spatial plan had, the credibility of the
information and justification from the plan was questionable. How could we be sure
that the plan was objective if too much politicking and bargaining intervened in the
process? How could we be sure that the outcomes of the plan were credible if the
project's existence was already justified?
The answer to such questions is the government's choice to conduct additional
studies, which includes:
e The introduction of Social Audit
One important issue in FI's case was the controversy about social achievement
of the communities in the old project's boundary. Realizing that social
condition information was crucial in starting a spatial policy, BAPEDAL and
the Minister of Mines and Energy encouraged FL to conduct social auditing.
The choice of audit study instead of the general social study is based on these
reasons: a) audit study could focus more on past FL's involvement and future
contribution to the development of the local communities, because the initial
hypothesis in this case was that social unrest were caused by the existence of
FL, b) an audit study could provide detail and implementable solutions for FI,
instead of just a general guidance, c) the study was funded by FI but directed
and evaluated by neutral agencies, particularly BAPEDAL.
" The introduction of Environmental Audit
Following the "success" of social auditing, BAPEDAL encouraged FL to
conduct similar audit study but only focussing on environmental issues. The
reasons on why environmental audit should be conducted separately and not
being integrated to EIA study were: a) past practices would be the focus of the
study, and b) the outcomes would emphasize more on self-examination and
self-prescription.
5) The Role of EIA as a Technical Guidance/Reference
There were many choices in the role of EIA in Indonesia: a) as a legal
requirement to get a permit, therefore the EIA study must provide an ultimate
decision, b) as an input to decision makers, therefore the EIA study must provide
alternative of answers, but c) if no direct obligations involved, the EIA must meet the
whatever information was needed before actual operation.
Following the implication in point a), FI's EIA study did not seem to make any
difference for permitting, because the permit was already granted anyway. However,
it fit point b), where EIA was extensively used to provide alternative efforts to
minimize impacts for the new project. Followed by the fact that the proponent
seriously conducted EIA study and approved before any construction begins, the
condition in point c) was also met.
6.2 Institutional Problems
6.2.1 Structural and Political Settings
Following the summary of the procedural problem in section 6.1 before, the
summary of institutional problem in spatial planning and EIA evaluation consists of
1) Complexity of task delegation and authorization
Some examples on how complex and confusing task delegation and authorization are:
* The role of Governor and Head of District, and its relationship to the central
government
Defining the role of Governor or Head of District as the representatives of Local
Government proven to be the most difficult one. Governor and Head of District,
have two functions: as a head of local governance and a head of region9 . A head of
local governance implies full autonomy in governing, while the function of a head
of region implies delegation of task from the capital city to each regions without
autonomy. As the head of local governance, the governor or head of district have
no obligation to follow central government agencies, and in this function they only
report and be responsible to the President (via Minister of Home Affairs). They
have their own institutions that have full autonomy in governing, called "local
government". However, as the head of region, the governor or head of district
9 This is a very tricky explanation, since I must translate all the definitions into English. In Indonesian,
the functions are divided into Head of Wilayah and Head of Daerah. Both wilayah and daerah have the
same meaning in English: "region". Because in this case the two definitions are used to differ the type of
autonomy and function of the head of local government, I settle to use local governance as an English
version of daerah and region as an English version of wilayah. Important to note that this translations are
not the same in dictionaries nor in other passages in this study. This is only usable in this passage.
must "yield" to the central government agencies. They have the responsibility to
coordinate and manage all regional offices from these agencies, but unable to
direct these offices freely because these offices are only responsible to their central
offices. If this is sound confusing, then in practice this is much more confusing.
The governor often has difficulties in intervening a certain project or development
initiated by a sector, despite their autonomy to object and refuse it if does not meet
their interest. How such complexity can be solved? In practice, this situation
depends on the political back-up that the region received. For those which have
strong figures as the head of local government, the autonomy can be exercised
optimally, but those which have not are usually yield to the demands that the
central agencies are putting.
Figure 6.3
The Dualism Function of Head of Local Government
* Sector's vs formal sequence of development
With the dichotomy of local vs central government authority, formal sequence
might not be practiced similarly. The FI and Kapuknaga cases are good examples
on how the local government and the central government conduct the procedure
when their own interests are at stake. If the task of issuing permit in FI case went
to the local government, it was possible that the procedure sequence would be
different. With the urgent need to distribute costs and responsibility to the
investor, the EIA and spatial plan would be approved first before the permit was
issued.
2) Strong 'sectoral minded' among sectors and across level of governance
It is no longer a secret that each sector and level of governance possess strong
individual interests. This is partly caused by the ambiguity of giving full autonomy to
the local government, thus create unclear boundary between central agency authority
and local government authority. Such situation fuels competition as well as rivalry
among them, and this is often the main cause of severe lack of coordination and
attention to particular projects. Both cases had illustrated this situation.
3) Competition of power and influence between central and local government
As a result from point 2), each government institution exercise their
competency in influencing the outcomes. This is usually achieved through financial
resources. Central government, especially agencies that conquers more financial
resources than others, usually exercise their power and influence over a region's fate
through national-budget projects. The local government usually use private investors
to gain such freedom, therefore justifying their actions to attract and place private
sectors' interests as priorities.
4) Lack of human resources and back-up system
Obvious source of institutional weaknesses is lack of human resources and
back-up system. The percentage of public officials in local and central government
agencies that graduated from universities is relatively small. Several of them are even
considered unskilled labor and only graduated from elementary school. Furthermore,
due to lack of financial resources, the offices of this agencies, mostly in regions, are
considered inadequate to operate. Mostly because they have very few facilities for
database maintenance.
5) The importance of "elite groups" in decision making
As explained in both cases, the role of "elite groups", which were mostly
private companies with large fundings, crucial in designing the process. In fact, these
groups' interests are the most influencial factor in many of the development projects.
The reason is mostly because there are no single local governments in Indonesia
capable to finance their own development fully from their pocket. As a result, they are
vulnerable to figures that have money, which are well-known conglomerates or
investors (especially those who also have direct contacts with political figures in the
central government).
6) The importance of supporting central government's decision
Following previous points that implied the independency of local government to
the central government as a result of lack of autonomy and financial resources, the
local government has little choice in exercising their freedom to object central
government's decision. The dualism function of the head of the local government is a
good explanation on why supporting the central government is very important.
Though local autonomy has become popular lately and possibly exercised in the future,
there are logical reasons why the unity of policy across regions must be achieved.
They are:
" The importance of national security
The history of continuing eruption of people unrests as well as local rebellions to
separate themselves from the government of Indonesia also give burdens to many
people in various places of the country. Based on this situation, the central
government has the importance to gain full control in every regions, especially
remote areas.
" The importance to control national economic growth
Indonesia has practiced many variety of economic policies over the years, and for
them, the capability to control national growth is very important to direct the
development. Many examples have shown that without full control on each
regions, national growth can not be achieved optimally. This is because each local
government might compete instead of cooperate or cross-sub sidised one another.
Furthermore, efficient use of resources might not be achieved.
e The importance to support cross-subsidy of resources among regions
As mentioned in the previous point, uneven distribution of resources forced the
central government to cross-subsidy certain regions. Because of this, the local
governments must fully support it. If there are not enough control imposed on
them by the central government, the wealthiest regions might not want to
participate in subsidising the poorests, considering that they might also need to
gain further growth.
7) Unclear Compliance Responsibility
There is no direct responsibility line between the institution who conducts
planning and the one who conducts development compliance. Government system in
Indonesia established monitoring institution as a separate institution with the others,
including planning institution. This system is meant to decrease volumes of work, as
well as collusions. Unfortunately, such condition provide new weaknesses, because
lack of vertical responsibility linkage between those who plans and those who complies
can produce disintegrated development. Described later in figure 6.3, it is seen that
the only linkage that both institutions have is in the Head of Region/Local Government
(Governor or Head of District/Mayor). The continuation of concept from planning to
development is in the hand of the Head of Region, which relies heavily on his/her
individual capability to integrate both concept.
However, the dualism of the head of local government's function creates
curious settings of monitoring and compliance system for evaluating the performance
of the local governance. As the head of local government, the governor and head of
district use Provincial or District Inspectorate (Inspektorat Wilayah Propinsi or
Kabupaten) as their monitoring agencies. This institution must value the local officials
performance and report it directly to the head of local government. The head of local
government itself is valued and monitored by the local Board of Representatives.
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Unfortunately, the Inspectorate is not eligible to value and monitor the
performance of regional offices. The central agencies themselves create Inspectorate
offices to monitor them and report directly to the Minister. The governor and head of
district is not eligible in intervening or even receiving reports of compliance from these
inspectorates. Because of this, they are completely unable to have any power or even
influence for the regional offices fate.
Figure 6.3
Actors and Responsibility Lines in Development Monitoring and Compliance
at the Regional Level
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PROCEDURE AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL
SET-UP IMPROVEMENT
Strategic solution for environmental planning problems in Indonesia lies in the
improvement of the procedure and institutional set-up. Based on previous analysis, this
chapter will discuss the steps to improve the situation.
The discussion in this chapter will be divided into two sections: a) the section that
analyze the judgements of improving procedure and institutional set-up, and b) the section
that analyze possible alternative solutions for solving the problem.
7. Judgments of Procedure and Institutional Improvement
7.1 The Failure of Formal Procedure
As mentioned in the case discussion, the failure of the formal procedure included:
1) The Effectiveness of Spatial Planning Procedure
The spatial planning procedure requires clear guidance from higher level governance
to reduce misinterpretation and enhance the coordination between agencies and levels.
Without it, regional government will have difficulties in predicting future development
inside or at the surrounding area. However, the complexity of national development
operational with its "sector" tendency and the way the government institution is being
setup do not support proper coordination. This, along with the fact that national
spatial plan is not being published yet (not to mention the needed provincial and
district plans), highlights the impossibility of conducting spatial planning according to
the formal procedure. The two previous cases have shown how difficult to follow the
procedure when the necessary preliminary requirements are not available. However,
one might argue that this problem is temporary. If national and provincial plans are
available, local spatial planning will most likely be in a much better condition than
today. Is this argument true? The two case studies provide several important points
to consider:
a. With the fact that multisector projects are proposed at the national level instead of
at the regional level, regional plans are unlikely to be prepared for new initiatives.
District plans will be vulnerable of "re-evaluation" that may abuse their original
contents. Unless the regional government processes complex projects or the
regional government possess adequate visions for future development, spatial
planning will most likely be treated as "accessory" instead of used as formal
guidance.
b. Formal and ineffective communication among government institution will prevent
coordination during planning, no matter how integrated the working environment
is. Mostly influenced by the working culture in Indonesia, spatial planning
procedure is not transparent and open to the public. This is one of the most
important sources of coordination problem.
Although national and provincial plans will be available in the future, there is no
guarantee that the formal procedure will be easier to conduct. These two points
emphasized the importance of recognizing local government autonomy and changing
the working culture as requirements to achieve a better and effective spatial planning
procedure.
1) The Effectiveness of EIA Procedure
There is a big question plaguing EIA procedure in Indonesia. Should we treat it as a
feasibility study or a legal requirement? In theory, these two functions complement
each other. A feasibility study will be effectively used if it is also a legal requirement.
However, previous cases have shown that the situation is not as simple as it seems.
Regarding EIA as a feasibility study, the proposal should pass initial requirements first,
for example, the confirmation of the location, project scale, and basic design. If this
initial information is adequate, the study will provide better and detailed judgment on
the environmental feasibility of the project. The consequence of this is the importance
of spatial plan approval to confirm the location of the project. However, many ignore
this function. Kapuknaga case has shown that EIA, as a legal requirement is much
more important than its function as a feasibility study. Therefore, EIA document does
not always contain proper information. However, for the sake of the development, the
EIA will be processed but requiring additional studies and procedures to cover the
"weakness" of this study.
How do we ensure the effectiveness of EIA procedure? The previous cases provide
several important pointers and judgments for further solutions:
a. As long as rivalry among EIA commissions exist, EIA studies will not be
effectively used as feasibility studies. Furthermore, instead of serving as a rational
judgment for a project, they can be used as a justification for supporting a political
interest from a certain agencies/government.
b. EIA lost its root in the local government. This concept's practice concentrates too
much at the central level, particularly since almost all permits were issued at this
level. The existence of integrated commission does not dismiss the current void in
local interests' representation.
c. The link between EIA and post evaluation implementation is missing. There are no
guarantees that the proponent will execute suggestions from EIA results. After
EIA approvals, the commission's task is finish. Who will be responsible in ensuring
the implementation of the result? The institutional setup seems not well prepared
for this need.
2) The Linkage of Spatial Plan and EIA
The linkage of spatial plan and EIA seems to be standing on a thin ground. Their
connection is formal but inadequate to ensure consistencies. For example, the two
previous cases had treated their connection in various ways of implementation. The
first variety is about treating the sequence of each procedure. Which one should be
finished first? Spatial plan, or EIA? The second variety is about treating the material
content link between them. Which one can serve as an input to the other? Spatial
plan, or EIA? The third variety is about the content coordination between them.
Should EIA support spatial plan content, or not? First, we must summarize the case
findings:
a. Spatial plans relied on EIA as a source of input, instead of the other way around.
According to the formal procedure, it is not what intended to happen. However,
the idea of using EIA results for the sake of spatial planning is not bad at all.
b. EIA's content can oppose the current plan. EIA in Kapuknaga case served as a
justification of re-evaluating the policy of agriculture enclave in Northern
Tangerang. The consequence of such possibility will be the compliance of
implementation. If the permitting institution decided to support the plan instead of
the EIA result, should the project disregard any requirements from the study?
What will be the compliance consequences, especially if demands to ensure EIA
implementation are high?
c. The two points above directly related to the argument of the study's material
content. If EIA's position to the spatial plan is changed, so are their material
contents. That is, if EIA is conducted before spatial planning, they can influence
and direct the content of the plan. However, if EIA consistently followed spatial
plan, their content must limit their objection into technical feasibility only, not land
allocation feasibility.
The next section will focus the discussion in providing solutions for improving the
institutional setup in environmental planning. For additional consideration, a brief
discussion about the importance of political and cultural influences in supporting the
improvement of the system will end chapter 8.
8. Strategy for Improving Environmental Planning
8.1 Targets, Goals, and Priorities
There is no strong argument that opposites the need to use this system. Past
practices and the history of planning in Indonesia have helped the country to figure the
most possible way to answer their problems. So far, the environmental planning
regulation had provided hopeful signs of a much better control in the development, only its
implementation was not fully effective yet. Based on that reflection, the following strategy
intends to achieve a better performance of the regulation implementation, not to introduce
something new and disregard the existing system.
The target group in this strategy is government agencies. Though their
development is also important, the other stakeholders, such as the public, the private
sectors, and the NGO, will be only briefly discussed.
The goal of this strategy is a much more efficient and effective system of
environmental planning that consistently implemented. In order to achieve that, I divide
the goals into a set of priority list as described below:
1) Local government empowerment
2) Opening the process to the public and accommodating public participation
3) Simplification of the procedure
8.2 Step 1: Local Government Empowerment
Local government empowerment means the optimization of power and authority
into their hands. It requires transfer of power and utilization of autonomy to the hand of
the local government. This is maybe one of the most difficult and ambitious plan in
Indonesia, since local autonomy is relatively unfamiliar and "unfit" to the existing working
culture. However, this strategy is possible to realize, because the GOI has already
recognized its importance and planned to achieve it slowly at the beginning of 1998
(embodied in the National 5-year plan of 1998-2003).
The reasons of empowering the local government as most prioritized are: a) the
elimination of potential local policy inconsistency, b) the decrease of elite-groups
intervention, c) the decrease of sector disputes, and d) the simplification of decision
making process. Transferring most of the political power in decision making to the local
government can avoid unnecessary influence and disputes. Furthermore, this condition
will give a chance to a much more effective public participation.
The proposed alternatives for local governance improvement are general for all
level of regional government, the focus of most of the following points are for district
government. The reason of emphasizing empowerment at the district level is that most
implementation of all policies is in this level. Furthermore, provincial governance in
Indonesia are designed to be regional coordinators, therefore has limited authority in
permitting, initiating local projects, local planning, and complying development
monitoring, unless needed and asked by their subordinates. The provincial government
will be responsible in translating sectors' policies and interests in their area but leave the
freedom of decision to the district government. The alternatives for improving
environmental planning are:
1) Emphasizing operational planning at the district level
The most important point in this suggestion is the clarification between provincial
and district government's task in planning. The provincial government has the duty to
translate all national policy into their spatial plan. However, they must provide enough
flexibility for the district government to plan according to their local needs.
There are two ways to solve this problem: a) encouraging active participation from
district governments during provincial planning, or b) generalizing provincial plans so that
the district government can "maneuver" freely during district planning. The first way
emphasize the importance of provincial plan, which has to be as perfect and
accommodative as possible. However, provincial plans are "too close" to the national
plan, with the consequence of emphasizing more on national policy than local interests.
Furthermore, they cover too wide areas that detailing will be a hard work to do.
The second way emphasis more on the role of district plan as the operational plan.
That is treating the provincial plan only as a general guidance for a more detailed plan in
the district level. The advantage of this choice is the accommodation of more local people
to participate during planning. Local process provides better and easier access to meetings
and presentations. This choice also encourages important decision making that supports
autonomy to the local government. The possible disadvantage of this choice is the
complexity of integrating national policy in a more detailed planning, providing with the
fact that sectors' detail planning will occur at this level, instead at the provincial level.
2) The District Government's authority in development permitting and its
compliance
The head of district, via the head of the sector district office, is responsible in
issuing permits and licenses for all projects (except sensitive projects that requires national
attention and treatment).
If many doubts about the capability of the district government in assessing
technical feasibility of the project, it is the duty of each sector to provide guidance through
their regional offices to assist.
By emphasizing this task, local spatial plan will be more useful and the incentive to
conduct proper planning and a more consistent implementation is greater.
The consequence of delegating permitting to the district government is the
delegation of compliance authority to the district government. The problem that usually
emerges in this situation is about the reporting of monitoring. Sector projects are mostly
monitored by sectors' office and inspectorates, therefore limiting access and influence
from the Head of District or the public as well. Because of this, the sectors' regional
office or sectors' regional inspectorate must have compliance task and ending the line of
responsibility and decision making on this point. The need to report to the central office is
mostly come in a form of archiving information only. Integrating inspectorate office
between sectors and district government is a step to achieve that.
Important to note that, as long as the plan and EIA is properly used as regional
development guidance, the consistency of integrating planning and post development
monitoring in development will be higher.
3) Regional EIA commission empowerment
Regional commission is more capable to integrate various interests and members,
for example the public and sectors, because sectors' interests will be indifferent at this
level. It is the task of BAPEDAL and every sector to nurture the quality of regional
commission, particularly via human resource development and proper guidance.
8.3 Step 2: Opening the Process and Accommodating Public
Participation
Opening the process, or more correctly stated, creating a transparent process is
essential in supporting the need to eliminate unnecessary influence and private interests.
Furthermore, this strategy is helpful in controlling the outcome of decision making process
and effective as a tool to monitor the government's performance.
This point is important to accompany local government empowerment because
many still doubt that transferring power to the local officials will not reduce the possibility
of corruption and collusion, not to mention a better quality of development. Through
making the process transparent, such fears may be diminishing.
This step's action is to accommodate public participation in the process through
public announcement and encourage meeting participation.
However, because public participation is unfamiliar in Indonesian governance,
issues like proper representation, mediation, or conflict management must be resolved first
through exercise and open communication with all other stakeholders.
Another effort to support public participation is through making all the information
available for everyone. Spatial plan and EIA documents should be made available in lower
level government offices, such as community and village offices, public library and in
academic institutions as well.
8.4 Step 3: Reorganizing the Procedure Sequence
Following the previous points, simplification of the procedure sequence in
environmental planning and development is essential. This strategy can support efficient
decision making, eliminate collusion and unnecessary influence, ensure the consistency of
transfer of power between the central agencies to the local government, and ensure the
transparency of the process.
The basic structure of planning procedure is:
1) Operational Spatial Planning at the District Level
The regional government must emphasize its operational planning at the district
level. Provincial plan will serve as guidance, but detailed and formal land allocation must
be conducted at the district. The need to do this at district level instead of at the national
level as practiced today is because district scale is adequate to optimize detail planning.
The idea of conducting environmental assessment for land allocation policy instead
ofjust the project proposals is worth to accommodate. Kapuknaga and FI case have
shown the need to evaluate the environmental feasibility of a location since spatial
planning.
The role of public participation at district level is very important, because previous
cases has shown how the land market is eventually essential in determining the most
productive land uses. With the aid of experts and environmental standards, land allocation
assisted by the public should be more sensitive to future trend as well as more capable to
encourage social-economic development.
Consequently, environmental agency should be actively participating during district
planning. BAPEDAL is planning to open regional offices, however, not until the next 10
years that district level offices will be established. Academic institutions and NGOs should
gain more access in decision making to ensure proper determination of environmental
protection area. This is to cover human resource weaknesses in the district government's
planning department.
Figure 8.2
Alternative Procedure for
Environmental Planning and Development
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2) Screening the Project Proposals
With the intention to use spatial plan consistently for development guidance, the
anxiety over the credibility of land allocation can eventually diminish. The commitment of
the local government to needs to emphasize. That is, using spatial plans optimally.
Currently, allocation feasibility is being conducted at the national level, particularly
the sector that receives project proposals directly. However, this effort is often contradict
with the spatial plan or local interests. "Re-routing" project proposals to the local
government will integrate project screening with allocation feasibility and spatial plan
consistency.
It is an initial step to acquire location permit and eligibility to conduct EIA before
further process.
3) Process and Evaluation of Environmental Impact Assessment
Regional Commissions should conduct all EIA evaluation, and open the process to
the public. This effort is certainly much easier if conducted at the local level.
4) Permit Approvals and Compliance
Permit approvals are being conducted by the Head of District or head of sectors'
local offices based on EIA approvals or inputs. There are two distinctive permits: first,
the location permit issued by the local National Land Agency. This permit used to be the
source of "environmental dispute", because it is not based on proper environmental
consideration, except spatial plans, if available. With the introduction of allocation
feasibility during project screening and proper environmental assessment to evaluate
spatial plan, this permit is hoped to be more "environmentally sound".
The second permit is development license, given after EIA approvals and used all
EIA requirements for development guidance.
With the intention to delegate permitting to the local government, development
monitoring and compliance will be more integrated. The real problem that are faced by
now is the tendency of sectors to build their own operational procedure for monitoring
and compliance and seldom use EIA and spatial plans as their guidance. Hopefully, with
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the existence of "pooling" development operational from planning, permitting, and
monitoring in one hand, particularly the local government, a continuity between planning
and development monitoring will be enhance.
That is, enforcing local inspectorate, local sector offices or a task force consists of
these parties to conduct monitoring. The effort to publicize all projects development to
the public is also a good way to encourage public participation for monitoring.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The basic summary and conclusion of the linkage between EIA and spatial plan for
environmental planning in Indonesia consist of:
1) The optimality of using both tools for environmental planning
The development in Indonesia requires assurance of the consistency of planning
and implementation. Both EIA and spatial plans are functional as requirements and tools
to ensure proper environmental consideration. So far, their existence in environmental
planning had been recognised and followed. However, the low quality of those products
and vulnerabilities of personal interests assertions have made both tools subjects to
irresponsible attitudes, particularly unfair decision making, illegal collusion, and failure to
be neutral and credible.
The government should continue to use both tools in the sequence of development
procedure. However, to ensure their effectiveness, they should improve the procedure
and institutional set-up.
2) The basic improvements that are needed
Both EIA and spatial plan need proper process to enhance their quality and
credibility. That includes the possibility of delegating their development to the local
government and encouraging public involvement during the process.
Furthermore, additional tool can be used to enhance their effectiveness as well, for
example environmental assessment for spatial plan. This tool is capable to make EIA and
spatial plan more focus and well informed.
3) The possibility of institutional improvement
Based on the discussions before, current institutional set-up is the main cause of
ineffective use of EIA and spatial plans. Therefore, the institutional set up is not capable
to support environmental planning properly.
Basic improvements should consider the delegation of tasks to the local
government that can ensure a much more transparent and simple procedure, as well as
more sensitive to public needs. However, cultural constraints can prevent faster
improvement unless supported by strong political will.
Currently, the vision of empowering local government as well as the demands to
include the public more actively in development has been consistently campaigned by
many political figures as well as other nation's government. This can be a strong incentive
for the GOI to start to consider it.
According to various sources, the current economic crisis has encouraged the
public to participate in development process, as well as forcing the government to be more
publicly open and sensitive to mass interests and opinions. This is a very good
opportunity to change the paradigm of Indonesian governance by starting to conduct
programs that emphasis public participation and transparency, as well as empowering local
governments to conduct development.
4) The future of environmental planning
The future of environmental planning will be more optimistic if spatial plan's
quality is more enhanced from time to time so that simpler procedure is being achieved.
Furthermore, it is also necessary to consider the possibility of integrating EIA as a "built-
in" project plan, thus eliminating long procedure of formal evaluation.
This will educate all stakeholders, particularly investors and developers to start
thinking "smartly" and "environmentally sound" before initiating and developing their
project. This, of course, needed supports by various parties, particularly business
environment to campaign "green movement" in production and development.
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Appendix 1
The Chronology of Kapuknaga Waterfront City Project
1970s- - The development of integrated irrigation system that
mid 1980s covers the northern part of three districts around
Jakarta: Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi (Botabek)
1985 - The legalisation of northern part of Botabek as a
protected agriculture area by the Ministry of Public
Works through Jakarta-Botabek Masterplan
1993 - The initiative to develop Jakarta Waterfront City
- One of a major conglomerate only has a small portion
of location in the project, which lead them to consider
of acquisiting the neighboring land in Tangerang
1994 - Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Review still
confirming the status of Northem Tangerang as a
protected area (this study issued by the Minister of
Public Works)
- The Provincial Plan of West Java confirmed the above
status
- The President issued Presidential Decree No. 17 to
ensure the protection of agricultural enclave in this
area
- The conglomerate mentioned before, S, proposed a
9,000 ha waterfront city in northem Tangerang to the
Govemor of West Java. The project is called Kapuk-
naga
- The Govemor of West Java propose the President to
reconsider agriculture protection and support the project
1995 - The President approved the Govemor's proposal, and issued
Presidential Decree No. 73 to disregard previous decree. The
decree also stating the Govemor as the responsible proponent.
- The Minister of Environment required the Govemor to
conduct regional EIA for the project
- The Govemor signed a joint-venture contract with S, and
established Kapuknaga Indah Co.
1996 - Clarification among ministries, the City Government of
Jakarta, and the Provincial Government of West Java were
conducted.
- The Governor of West Java issued Govemor Regulation No.
3 that approved the Kapuknaga Project and disregard
agriculture function of the area
- The Governor also issued Gov. Reg. No. 2 that disregard
environmental protection area inside Kapuknaga boundary
1997 - Both EIA and district plan were conducted simultaneously
1998 - Both EIA and district plan were planned to be finished
Appendix 2
The Chronology of Freeport Gold and Copper Mines Project
1967 - KK-GI (First Generation Contract) was signed and approved
- Freeport Indonesia was established
1970 - The first export of copper was conducted
1973 - The Tembagapura City was established
1977 - World price of copper was falling and the remaining copper
deposit in the old mine was very small
late 1970s - The first effort to optimised gold production as a replacement
for falling copper production
1986 - The beginning of gold exploration in Mount Grasberg
1989 - Freeport Indonesia applied contract extension for a bigger
production for copper and gold
early 1990s - The first highly publicised of criticism from environmentalists
and representatives of local and indigeneous people
1991 - The Minister of Mines and Energy granted the KK-G2 (2nd
generation contract) for an area of 2,900 km2
- FI was required to conduct environmental management and
actively participated in local communities development
1993 - The Provincial Plan of Irian Jaya was approved
- Fl lobbied the Ministry of Forestry to move the boundary
of Lorentz Preservation Area outside FI area
- The request was granted but unable to be removed from the
Provincial Plan content
1995 - EIA must be conducted as soon as possible
- The Minister of Environment requested social audit
1996 - Mimika District Plan was requested to be conducted
- The Minister of Environment requested environmental audit
- Amungme tribe sued FI to the New Orleans Justice Court
- Amungme rebellions kidnapped scientists, demanded a cancel
of KK-G2
- Severe protests and criticisms heightened
1997 - FI won New Orleans Court
- The District of Mimika approved KAMM Watershed Plan
- FI donated 1% of its profit revenue to the local people,
resulting in tribal wars and social unrests
- Environmental Audit was finished
- Regional EIA was approved
